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a b s t r a c t 
Individuals don’t often have privacy expectations. When asked to consider them, privacy 
realities were frequently perceived not to meet these expectations. Some websites exploit 
the trust of individuals by selling, sharing, or analysing their data. Without intervention, 
individuals do not often understand privacy implications, nor do anything to address it. 
This study has identified that many users do not have privacy expectations. An extension 
developed for this study improved privacy awareness, privacy behaviour, and created pri- 
vacy expectations in participants. The extension also demonstrated that privacy-focused 
behavioural changes occur when individuals consider the implications of privacy policies, 
and are exposed to the ways in which their data is being used. 
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license 




























Poor privacy decisions may lead to undesirable consequences,
such as the sale of personal data to unknown third-parties,
or unexpected personal data collection for use in newsletters,
personalisation, analytics, or even phishing attempts. Data is
increasingly valuable and recent changes in law - specifically
the principles in Art. 5, section 2 of the General Data Protec-
tion Act (GDPR) - have been designed to restrict how data is
managed ( European Commission, 2018 ). 
Has trust in large online companies become an expecta-
tion rather than a consideration, and would perceptions and
expectations of trust change if the value of personal data and
the ways it could be used were clearer? For some companies, it
may be more profitable to accept privacy issues - and potential∗ Corresponding author. 
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( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) fines - rather than address them. As people continue to give
their data away, are they considering whether the trust they
place in websites is warranted? 
The privacy paradox claims that people are concerned
about their privacy, but usually give it away for relatively
small rewards ( Pötzsch, 2009 ). Many people may have already
decided to hand over their personal details to several web-
sites, but this decision was based on personal judgement; it
is hard to put your trust in someone you have never met,
and whom you may never meet, where the website acts as
a mediator. Given this, many websites provide transparency
of usage through a privacy policy. Privacy policies are used to
disclose the ways in which data is gathered, disclosed, and
managed, in a legal document; but do people read these, and
do they understand their implications? Privacy policies are
designed to make privacy decision making transparent, yetemouth.ac.uk (S. Faily), jhenriksenbulmer@bournemouth.ac.uk (J. 
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4% of web users do not read them ( Obar and Oeldorf-Hirsch,
018 ). 
To date, there has been no resolution of the privacy para- 
ox. Rather than attempting to resolve it, the aim of our work 
s to educate users on it. We achieve this by providing a plat- 
orm where users can make more informed privacy decisions 
n disclosing personal data, along with a better understand- 
ng of how that data might be used. Additionally, this study ex- 
lores whether there are common discrepancies between the 
ontent of privacy policies and the actions of websites, and –
f there are discrepancies – to determine why these discrepan- 
ies may occur and therefore whether it is justifiable to always 
rust the content of a privacy policy. 
Existing work in this area has yielded no clear method 
or raising awareness to improve user understanding and 
roviding a basis for making better privacy-based decisions 
o ensure users believe that the trust they place in web- 
ites is warranted and meets their expectations. Privacy 
wareness has influenced how users interact with web- 
ites ( Paramarta et al., 2019 ), while privacy extensions can 
aise awareness ( Schaub et al., 2016 ). And while most users 
o not read privacy policies, many have an increased trust in 
 website if it has one ( Wu et al., 2012 ). 
Existing tools can block tracking cookies, but provide no 
ontext on what it is they are blocking, and how this impacts 
he user. By using such cookie blocking tools, it can be easy 
o forget how untrustworthy a website is with some of their 
orst intensions shielded from view. However, these types of 
locking tools are useful for gauging and improving privacy 
wareness, purely through demonstrating how much privacy- 
nvasive content is being blocked on each website. 
In contrast, we present the Privacy Paradox extension: a 
rowser extension capable of interpreting privacy policies,
nd displaying them to users in a simple, readable, sum- 
arised format whereby users can easily assess their per- 
eived trust against their expectations of the content from the 
rivacy policy. This extension automatically scans the organi- 
ation’s privacy policy, comparing this to the actual data us- 
ge for their website and producing a concise summary for the 
ser of the results. By combining this intention to raise aware- 
ess with a method of evaluating privacy policies in a usable 
ay, the Privacy Paradox extension provides users with a bet- 
er platform for evaluating their trust in each website, with 
espect to their own privacy expectations. 
In presenting the Privacy Paradox we make three contribu- 
ions. First, we provide a design and implementation exem- 
lar for an extension for evaluating how the privacy paradox 
s played out. Second, we present a case study application that 
emonstrates how the Privacy Paradox extension can be used 
o evaluate how the privacy paradox is played out. Third, we 
emonstrate how the Privacy Paradox extension can be incor- 
orated into privacy education/awareness interventions. 
In Section 2 , we review of related research, considering 
ser privacy and how user access websites, and considering 
ey concepts relevant to this study. In Section 3 , we describe 
he the methods used within the study; these include a study 
lan, methods for eliciting requirements, and an analysis of 
he design and implementation elements of the extension 
nd their accompanying evaluation methods. This is followed 
y a requirements analysis in Section 4 , before introducing he designs for the extension and accompanying artefacts in 
ection 5 . In Section 6 , we formatively evaluate the Privacy 
aradox extension, and summatively evaluate it by consid- 
ring whether websites are creating realistic privacy policies 
hich meet user expectations and do not contradict the in- 
entions of those websites. Finally, in Section 7 we conclude 
ith a critical analysis of the implications of results, threats 
o validity, and consider future work. 
. Related work 
.1. Attitudes to privacy 
ndividuals have different observable attitudes towards their 
rivacy depending on demographic and personal experi- 
nce. Several surveys have identified privacy as some of the 
ost pressing concerns of those using information tech- 
ology Acquisti and Grossklags (2004) , and Kokolakis sug- 
ests that a phenomenon known as the privacy paradox 
hows how individuals do not make privacy conscious deci- 
ions Kokolakis (2017) . 
The privacy paradox – a phenomenon covered extensively 
hroughout privacy literature – highlights the discrepancy be- 
ween an individual’s intentions to protect their privacy and 
ow they actually behave online; the difference between what 
ersonal information individuals intend to disclose, and the 
nformation which they do disclose are often different. The 
rivacy paradox affects almost everyone, regardless of their 
wareness or expertise. 
Privacy decision making is often determined based on 
 privacy trade-off. This behaviour is observed in the 
ttribute-attribution framework, which stipulates that atti- 
udes develop and may be reinforced by violations of pri- 
acy Norberg and Horne (2007) . Norberg & Horne explain that 
hese attitudes can contradict observed behaviours because 
ndividuals have an increased likelihood to focus on the im- 
ediate benefits from the disclosure of personal information.
here are other explanations for this behaviour though, with 
o accepted definitive reason, including social theory-based 
heories. For example, younger people are generally perceived 
o be less concerned with privacy, and choose to maintain 
heir digital image over privacy concerns Blank et al. (2014) . 
Cranor claims that individuals are typically less willing 
o provide information when that information is personally 
dentifiable to them, but this could be balanced out: 28% of par- 
icipants were more likely to provide personal information to a 
ebsite if it had a privacy policy, while 58% of participants in- 
icated that they would be more likely to provide information 
f the website also had a trust seal Cranor et al. (1999) . However,
his work also indicated that none of the participants under- 
tood what a trust seal was or how it worked; this indicates 
hat attitudes towards privacy can be influenced by proper- 
ies of trust, regardless of whether they have been verified as 
rustworthy. 
.2. Privacy awareness 
rivacy awareness is a measure of how aware individuals are 
f the privacy landscape and the privacy decisions which they 




































































































make. In theory, by raising privacy awareness, Potzsch con-
tends that people can make informed decisions which should
lead to less privacy-invasive behaviour ( Pötzsch, 2009 ). How-
ever, in practice, individuals tend to disclose large amounts of
personal information, regardless of their attitude and aware-
ness towards privacy. This suggests that users – regardless
of privacy awareness – are equally susceptible to the privacy
paradox. Nonetheless, a study of the 3 most popular social
media websites (Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram) indicated
that, by increasing user awareness, the willingness to share
information decreases ( Paramarta et al., 2019 ). However, this
was typically balanced by trust. When expressed through pri-
vacy awareness techniques, this increased the willingness to
share personal information. The result of this balance sup-
ports Potzsch’s claim that users, regardless of privacy aware-
ness, are equally susceptible to the privacy paradox. 
Improving an individual’s privacy awareness is one of the
most suggested techniques in resolving the privacy paradox,
but is not an accepted solution. Previous work has shown that,
by raising privacy awareness, individuals might disclose less
of their personal data than before ( Deuker, 2010 ). 
2.3. Trust 
The constant development of relationships over the internet
- amid changing regulations and technology - means that the
reliance on trust in technology mediated interactions contin-
ues to grow. In parallel, the risk consumers face is also con-
stantly growing; placing trust in a potentially unknown com-
pany, with no physical interaction and no physical presence is
risky, whether the consumer is technically minded or absent-
minded. 
During initial or one-off interactions, the signalling of
trust-warranting properties is particularly important, and in
repeating or returning interactions, an acceptable level of
trust is usually already present through temporal embed-
dedness ( Flavián and Guinalíu, 2006 ). Many trust-warranting
properties are often not considered by individuals - including
those covered within Section 2.6 - and this can lead to mis-
placed trust in a website. 
Technology can be used in 3 ways in trust interactions, and
submits signals prior to a trusting action, be the channel for a
trusting action, and be used for fulfilment ( Riegelsberger et al.,
2005 ). Properties of contextual trust create the means to war-
rant trust in another actor. These properties can be con-
tinually assessed and evaluated - both cognitively and pre-
cognitively - and are essential to Technology Mediated Inter-
actions (TMI). In any transaction, risks, benefits, and trust war-
ranting properties are prevalent. 
While Riegelsberger, Sasse & McCarthy welcome the poten-
tial of trust mediating technologies to enable interactions that
would otherwise not have been possible, they do not consider
the individual or legal implications of unwarranted trust in-
teractions and their consequences. 
2.4. Privacy policies 
Data privacy has evolved to cover a much broader scope in-
cluding the increasing usage of database, cookies, and track-
ers. Privacy policies help build consumer trust by reducing thefear that a users’ personal information will be disclosed. Their
content influences user interaction with websites where there
is a requirement to provide personal information ( Wu et al.,
2012 ). 
Additionally, privacy concerns were found to have a signif-
icant influence on trust ( Peterson et al., 2007 ). However, Wu
et al. do not consider the likelihood that a user will initially
engage with privacy policies, and make the assumption that
all users who visit a website will read the them, which is a
misconception ( Wu et al., 2012 ). 
In 2018, Obar and Oeldorf-Hirsch found that 74%
of consumers accept privacy policies without reading
them ( Obar and Oeldorf-Hirsch, 2018 ). They claim that
the “biggest lie on the internet” is agreeing to terms and
conditions and suggests that the practice of ignoring privacy
policies is so widespread that it points to regulatory failure. Of
the participants who did read the privacy policies, 96% were
found to spend 5 min or less reading them; a (typical) privacy
policy of around 8000 words would take around 15–17 min
to read. This suggests that even those who do read privacy
policies, do not take the time to digest them; in fact, Obar and
Oeldorf-Hirsch found that 86% of study participants who did
read the privacy policy spent less than a minute doing so. 
While much work in this area focus on links between
privacy policy, trust, and the privacy paradox, little exists
on the effect of the EU General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) ( European Commission, 2018 ) on these links. Accord-
ing to Linden, the introduction of GDPR in May 2018 has con-
tributed to an increase of 4.9% in websites now having privacy
policies since the law came into effect ( Linden et al., 2020 ). 
2.5. Parsing 
As Obar and Oeldorf-Hirsch [ibid] demonstrated, very few in-
dividuals take the time to read a privacy policy. By parsing a
privacy policy, it may be possible to create a summary which
individuals are more likely to engage with. Parsing is a method
of analysing strings of text into logical components to form
a conceptual representation. In the context of the proposed
artefact, a website privacy policy could be parsed to extract
relevant data which can be summarised and presented to the
user. 
The Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) was an attempt
to parse privacy policies in a computer-readable format. P3P
was published by the World Wide Web Consortium in April
2002, and adopted by browsers shortly after ( Cranor et al.,
2002 ). P3P encodes privacy policies in XML format which can
then be interpreted by the browser ( Cranor, 2003 ). Its aim was
to make it easier to digest, interpret and understand privacy
policies - key issues identified by Obar and Oeldorf-Hirsch.
However, P3P was obsoleted in August 2018 due to several crit-
ical problems and ambiguity such as the absence of formal se-
mantics ( Olurin et al., 2012 ). When considered alongside Obar
and Oeldorf-Hirsch’s findings, it is sensible to assume that the
use of P3P would be limited anyway. Nonetheless, as a poten-
tial solution to aspects of the ‘privacy paradox’, the technology
remains an important consideration for modern-day online
data privacy. 
In 2006, Weitzner et al. adapted P3P as a rule-based
policy management system for open deployment on the












































































































eb ( Weitzner et al., 2005 ). This work suggests that the web 
ails at satisfying critical policy requirements such as privacy 
rotection and that by extending the use of rule-based poli- 
ies to privacy, e.g. an access policy is created to allow users of 
 particular role to access specific data based on the privacy 
ettings of that specific data. 
Several technical challenges prevent either P3P or policy- 
ware web from becoming successful. For either implementa- 
ion to work, wider changes to local and remote technologies 
re necessary. Both technologies require support from both 
he webpage and client (browser) to work; Internet Explorer 
nd Edge were the only major browsers which supported P3P,
lthough support has since ended for these too, and Weitzner 
t al.’s policy-aware web is not yet supported by any major 
rowser. 
.6. Web tracking 
eb tracking uses technical tracking methods to deter- 
ine specific information about an individual. This informa- 
ion can restore previous browsing sessions, display person- 
lised adverts, and determine the location of an individual.
ost people believe that personal information collection is 
sed primarily for targeted advertising, but recent studies 
ave found that web tracking is being used for many other 
urposes, including: price discrimination, personalisation of 
earch results, and government surveillance ( Bujlow et al.,
017 ). Moreover, third-party tracking is becoming an increas- 
ng privacy threat; around 46% of the 10,000 most popular 
ebsites are monitored by at least one third-party tracker 
 Li et al., 2015 ). 
Storage-based tracking mechanisms depend on storing 
ata on personal computers. The most common form of 
torage-based tracking mechanism is a cookie: a small 
iece of data stored in the user’s browser. Local stor- 
ge is another form of storage-based tracking mechanism 
hich allows for larger data to be stored in a similar 
ay. 
Fingerprinting is a method of identifying a device by cre- 
ting a unique key. It uses a broad range of technologies to 
reate a unique identifier for a device, based on a range of fac- 
ors, such as operating system, browser version, and screen 
ize. Fingerprinting does not need to create any storage on 
he user’s device, but changes to the device such as increasing 
r decreasing the browser size can cause inconsistency when 
dentifying devices. 
Once a tracking mechanism has successfully identified a 
ser, a website may then request additional data on that user 
rom their own, or a third-party database. This is done in the 
orm of GET/POST requests, these are requests made to web- 
ites or web services which usually send a response. Once a 
ser is identified, a GET/POST request could be made to re- 
rieve that user’s profile picture, but is more frequently used 
or requesting data about that user from third parties, includ- 
ng their browsing history. 
The privacy paradox extension presented in this paper,
onsiders all the above tracking methods and attempts to 
ntercept or access them to display this information to the 
ser. .7. Security & privacy extensions 
s of March 2015, Google Chrome had the largest browser 
ser base with 63.7% of users ( Tsalis et al., 2016 ). With the
ost browser users, Google Chrome is the logical choice 
or development of an extension. Due to its popularity, the 
hrome Web Store contained around 43,000 free extensions in 
017 ( Sjösten et al., 2017 ). While it is recognised that this satu-
ation could decrease visibility; (50% of all Chrome extensions 
ave fewer than 16 installs ( Extension Monitor, 2019 )), accord- 
ng to a study by Tsalis in 2016, privacy extensions make up the
mallest share of security and privacy add-ons in the Chrome 
eb Store, at only 7.7% ( Tsalis et al., 2016 ). Moreover, privacy
xtensions fall well below the average across all browsers of 
4.15%, indicating a potential gap which, we contend, the pri- 
acy paradox extension could exploit. 
Existing privacy informative extensions such as Ghostery 
nd Disconnect aim to influence the privacy awareness of 
sers, much like the Privacy Paradox extension we present.
owever, these extensions focus on blocking trackers, rather 
han analysing collected data and privacy policies. This is 
here the Privacy Paradox extension is novel, by providing in- 
ividuals with clear information on website data collection,
nd allowing individuals to determine for themselves if their 
rivacy expectations are being met. 
Websites attempt to address user awareness issues with 
rivacy policies ( Schaub et al., 2016 ), but few extensions at- 
empt to improve their awareness, viability, or readability - 
nd none can achieve all three. Extensions can empower users 
y highlighting tracking activities, yet no tool exists to inform 
sers of the data they are giving away; individuals are unable 
o determine whether the privacy implications of using a web- 
ite meet their privacy expectations. 
In their work on extension design ( Schaub et al., 2016 ),
chaub et al. determined that alerts should be used sparingly 
o prevent them from becoming annoying. The information 
isplayed in the main panel should also be relevant, under- 
tandable, and actionable to users; where setup videos, tuto- 
ials and/or a website were available, users had greater trust 
n the extension. 
.8. Security problems with chrome extensions 
oogle Chrome extensions combine a mix of popular tech- 
ologies including: HTML (Hyper Text Markup Language), CSS 
Cascading Style Sheets), and JavaScript. HTML and CSS - 
hich are both static languages - are used for creating the 
iews within extensions, while JavaScript is used to provide 
pplication logic ( Mehta, 2016 ). Information about the Chrome 
xtension is located within a manifest file. A manifest file is 
 JSON-formatted file and can include the name, description,
nd version of the extension as well as more specific details 
uch as permissions and icon locations. Further, extensions 
re sandboxed within the browser, meaning that they are iso- 
ated from other extensions for improved security. 
When designing extensions for Google Chrome, the secu- 
ity of the extensions itself is rarely considered; Carlini et al.
iscovered 70 vulnerabilities across 40 extensions, in a secu- 
ity review of 100 Chrome extensions ( Carlini et al., 2012 ). Dur-
ng the security review, scripts fetched over HTTP were re- 




















































































Table 1 – Summary of study objectives. 
Objective Description 
O1 Evaluate whether Amazon’s and Facebook’s 
privacy policies meet user expectations. 
O2 Evaluate whether the data collection taking 
place on Amazon’s and Facebook’s websites 
meet user expectations. 
O3 Create a Google Chrome extension to improve 
the privacy-awareness and evaluate website 
violations. sponsible for 56% of the vulnerabilities found. All these vul-
nerabilities could be prevented using HTTPS requests (in place
of HTTP requests). Thus, in creating the the Privacy Paradox
extension, script injection will be avoided. 
Extensions have access to special privileges within the
browser, making them an appealing target for attack-
ers ( Google, 2020 ). Precautions should be taken to follow good
security architecture practices when designing an extension
to enable code transparency and demonstrate the trustwor-
thiness of the extension itself. 
2.9. Design and evaluation approaches 
Several design approaches have been considered for creat-
ing an extension, including prototyping. However, two design
approaches have been considered in more depth; these are
Nielsen’s heuristics and IBM Design Thinking. 
Neilsen’s heuristics contain 10 principles for user interface
design which were originally developed for heuristic evalu-
ation and ’refined based on a factor analysis of 249 usabil-
ity problems’ ( Nielsen, 1995 ). The ‘user control and freedom’,
‘flexibility and efficiency of use’, and ‘aesthetic and minimal-
ist design’ principles may be especially useful for the the Pri-
vacy Paradox extension as they will ensure that the design are
effective, efficient, and satisfactory. However, given the time
limitations imposed by this study, it may be difficult to imple-
ment all the design principles. 
IBM Design Thinking is a human-centred approach for cre-
ating ‘human-centred outcomes at speed and scale’ ( IBM Stu-
dios, 2016 ). It involves an approach of ‘applying design think-
ing at the speed and scale of modern enterprise demands’ and
consists of three principles: a focus on user outcomes, multi-
disciplinary teams, and restless reinvention. 
While IBM Design Thinking is focused towards enterprise
usage, there are elements of it which may be useful in design
creation of the Chrome extension, specifically the human-
centred elements described as a focus on user outcomes. 
Several evaluation approaches are available for evaluat-
ing models, approaches, designs, and outcomes ( Preskill and
Russ-Eft, 2012 ). Of these, we consider the Behavioural Objec-
tives Approach and Goal-Free Evaluation. 
The Behavioural Objectives Approach, focuses on the
degree to which the objectives of a program have been
achieved ( Preskill and Russ-Eft, 2012 ). In the context of this
study, this approach can be used to evaluate whether the
Chrome Extension achieved its objectives. 
The Goal-Free Evaluation focuses on actual, rather than the
intended, outcomes ( Preskill and Russ-Eft, 2012 ). Our work can
be used to evaluate what the actual effects of the Chrome Ex-
tension are (including any unintended side-effects). However,
it should be considered that guidance for conducting a goal-
free evaluation is limited ( Youker, 2019 ). 
Evaluation results can be affected by external factors. The
Hawthorne effect is an experimenter effect whereby partici-
pants in a human-centred study may exhibit atypically high
levels of performance as the result of an understanding that
they are being studied ( Macefield, 2007 ). This change in per-
formance occurs because participants believe that changes in
studies will improve their ability to perform. The aim of the
the Privacy Paradox extension is to improve the privacy aware-ness of individuals and participants may appreciate that there
will be a desire for them to display improved privacy aware-
ness when using the artefact. As such, participants may sub-
consciously perform more effectively. However, there is a large
amount of controversy surrounding the Hawthorne effect, and
there are many different interpretations of the original phe-
nomenon ( McCambridge et al., 2014 ). Only experimental solu-
tions to the Hawthorne effect exist ( Mayo and Dooley, 1968 ),
and can impact the behaviour of participants ( Sedgwick and
Greenwood, 2015 ). However, it could be considered unsafe to
criticise an experimental study based on the Hawthorne effect
alone. 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Study aims and objectives 
The aims and objectives of our study were determined us-
ing the ‘SMART’ criteria used in programme planning to de-
scribe programme expectations ( Toffler, 2013 ). SMART objec-
tives must follow specific criteria to be specific, measurable,
achievable, realistic, and time-bound; this approach to defin-
ing objectives creates goals which are more likely to be attain-
able. 
The first aim was to evaluate whether two websites, Ama-
zon and Facebook, meet their prescribed privacy policies, be-
fore then considering whether these meet the expectations of
a sample group of users interacting with them (see Table 1 ).
We achieved this by evaluating the trust between users and
these websites with respect to the data collection that takes
place, compared with the content of the privacy policies,
thereby helping us determine whether these websites act with
social responsibility (with regards to user expectations) to
abide by their privacy policies (see Section 6 ). 
To support the creation of Privacy Paradox, the results of
the background study were used to shape the expectations of
the extension, by understanding existing technologies, capa-
bilities, and ensuring that the extension could be considered
novel when compared with other privacy-based tools. 
3.2. Requirements elicitation 
Requirements were elicited based on an understanding of
similar extensions, and through other requirements gathering
processes, including discussions with prospective users. The
combination of personal and research-based requirements
gathering – including the analysis of similar extensions in






































































































ection 2.7 – allowed for an in-depth set of requirements to 
e specified. The resulting requirements focus on isolating the 
pportunity for creating something novel, while ensuring that 
he purpose of the extension remains well defined, in line with 
he expectations laid out during requirements gathering dis- 
ussions. The requirements are detailed in Section 4 . 
.3. Design method 
e used a prototyping methodology to designed and de- 
elop the extension, enabling continuous development and 
mprovement throughout each stage of this study. Prototyp- 
ng is a good tool for facilitating ongoing evaluation and rapid 
evelopment thus, users are regarded more likely to adopt any 
ystem created ( Avison and Fitzgerald, 2006 ). Thus, prototypes 
f the extension were developed early to speed up develop- 
ent, and improve the likelihood of overcoming obstacles ear- 
ier in the Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC). Prototypes 
ere also used to provide context during the design and im- 
lementation stage. 
.4. Evaluation design 
e conducted formative and summative evaluations to eval- 
ate the extension. Formative evaluation was conducted on 
he extension designs from a usability perspective using early 
rototypes of the extension. During the evaluation, 41 partic- 
pants took part in formative assessment and 19 participants 
ere involved with summative assessment. Formative assess- 
ent was spread across 4 focus groups and 11 1-to-1 interview 
essions. An ethics approval was requested from and provided 
y the University prior to the commencement of the study. 
.4.1. Formative evaluation 
arious methods for determining a suitable design for the ex- 
ension were considered including focus groups, interviews,
nd surveys. From these, conducting a survey was determined 
o be the most efficient and effective method of evaluating 
he design of the extension. A survey was used in order to 
acilitate access to a larger pool of participants, when com- 
ared to the other evaluation methods, due to the ability to 
omplete the evaluation quickly and remotely. This approach 
ave participants the opportunity to engage with the exten- 
ion throughout the SDLC. The formative evaluation was con- 
ucted with anonymous participants and focused on three 
sability principles: effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction.
his evaluation was then used to enhance the extension, prior 
o any summative evaluation taking place. 
.4.2. Summative evaluation 
ummative evaluation was used to determine which designs 
sers preferred from the extension as part of the prototyp- 
ng phase. The summative evaluation of the extension was 
onducted in focus groups after the feedback from the for- 
ative evaluation had been quantified and incorporated. Fo- 
us groups were selected and participants were encouraged 
o provide constructive feedback for the extension based on 
heir capabilities to provide detailed individual and collective 
omments. Two focus groups consisted of technical participants, while 
he other two consisted of non-technical participants. By 
eparating the focus groups in this way, it was possible to 
raw conclusions on differences between technical and non- 
echnical usage of the extension, and how this relates to pri- 
acy behaviour. 
During the evaluation, Goal-Free evaluation and the Be- 
avioural Objectives approach (as described in Section 2.9 ) 
ere used to evaluate the success of the extension in high- 
ighting privacy-issues. Goal-Free evaluation was used to re- 
lise the true outcomes of the extension and can be achieved 
y providing participants with a platform for open discussion 
bout the outcomes of using the extension. The Behavioural 
bjectives approach was be used to determine whether par- 
icipants behaved with an increased privacy-awareness after 
sing the extension; this was achieved by allowing the par- 
icipants to use specific websites with and without the exten- 
ion and determining differences in behaviour, where desired 
ehaviour would show an increased desire to attempt to un- 
erstand the privacy risks facing them on each website. This 
esire could be expressed through extensive use of the ex- 
ension, its popup, or by showing an increased interest in un- 
erstanding the privacy-related consequences prior to mak- 
ng privacy-based decisions. 
Following the focus groups, participants were given the op- 
ion to participate in an interview which analysed their be- 
avioural changes [if any] after using the extension over a 
onger period. The interview consisted of open questions to 
etermine whether privacy expectations were being met, and 
hether participants noticed changes in their privacy aware- 
ess. 
More detailed information on the approaches taken to 
valuate the extension are explained within Section 6 . 
. Requirements 
equirements were gathered through the process explained 
n Section 3.2 . A mixture of background (document-based) re- 
earch and user feedback was used to determine the require- 
ents which are outlined below. 
.1. Extension specifications 
he extension was devised to provide privacy transparency to 
sers in two key areas: privacy policies, and tracking meth- 
ds. From this, a set of requirements were elicited, and sum- 
arised in Table 2 . 
The first three requirements (R1-R3) formed the primary 
ocus of the extension design and feature prominently in the 
nished extension. Requirements R4 - R6 focus on providing 
dditional value, novelty, and detail to the extension. 
.2. Access, analyse, and present privacy policy 
he extension shall be able to access, analyse and present the 
rivacy policy of a website in a summative form, and thereby 
llow the user to make a faster and more transparent privacy 
ecision based on a better understanding of the privacy im- 
lications they may face. 
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Table 2 – Requirements list. 
Requirements Id Specification Reference 
R1 Access, Analyse, and Present 
Privacy Policy 
[4.2] 
R2 Intercept and Display Trackers [4.3] 
R3 Detect Privacy Violations [4.4] 
R4 Full Report of Findings [4.5] 
R5 Report Privacy Violations [4.6] 



























































Satisfying this requirement helps users circumvent the
challenges faced in Section 2.4 , specifically related to the tol-
erance of time spent analysing policies, and the high rate of
individuals who ignore them completely. 
The privacy policy summary will be categorised into four
clear sections: Data Collection, Data Usage, Choices, and
Tracking. 
4.2.1. Data collection 
Personal data being collected by the website shall be obtained
and summarised as a readable list. To conserve space, the ex-
tension will only show whether personal data is collected. 
4.2.2. Data usage 
If data is being collected, how it is used shall be obtained and
displayed. This includes whether personal data will be shared
to third-parties, or for personalization purposes. Additionally,
data security will be considered within this category; if the pri-
vacy policy does not mention any steps which are in place to
protect personal data, the extension shall assume that there
are none. 
4.2.3. Choices 
The choices users can make regarding their personal data
shall be summarised within this category. This will include
whether users can reject trackers and data collection, and
whether there is any consequence for doing so. Furthermore,
the extension shall determine whether users can request a
copy of their personal information, as they are legally enti-
tled to do under Article 15 of the GDPR ( European Commis-
sion, 2018 ). 
4.2.4. Tracking 
A summary of the ways which users may be tracked shall also
be included. The tracking types will include analytics, usabil-
ity tracking, tracking for personalised advertising, and track-
ing cookies. 
4.3. Intercept and display trackers 
Trackers – specifically those described in Section 2.6 – shall
be displayed via the extension so the user can view the data
collection techniques in action against them in real-time. 
This requirement provides transparency of use by alerting
users to the personal data being collected, and allows for com-
parisons to be made between the user’s expectations based
on the privacy policy, and the reality perceived from real datacollection. This empowers users to make better privacy deci-
sions, and act upon potential privacy violations which they
may not have otherwise been alerted to. By providing users
with a thorough understanding of the implications on their
privacy through the personal data being collected, privacy-
based decisions awareness should be improved. 
Five categories of tracker should be displayed to users: Ses-
sion Trackers, Advertising Trackers, Ad-Block Detection, Loca-
tion, and Fingerprinting. 
4.3.1. Session trackers 
Session trackers identify users and enable website personal-
isation. They typically provide a continuous user experience,
such as keeping users logged in between pages. However, they
can also be used for identifying individuals from third parties
and enable targeted advertising practices. As a result, users
should be warned when session trackers are being used. 
4.3.2. Advertising trackers 
Advertising trackers collect information about users from
other webpages, enabling targeted advertising. If a website is
collecting personal data for the purposes of showing targeted
adverts, users should be made aware from the extension. 
4.3.3. Ad-block detection 
Ad-Blocking tools have become common within most
browsers. These are used for hiding or removing adverts
from webpages. The extension should be able to detect when
a website is running explicit tests to check whether an ad-
blocker is being used, as this may suggest that the website will
attempt to circumvent the ad-blocking and thereby restrict
the users choices when using the website. 
4.3.4. Location 
Websites tracking the specific location of their users should
be detected by the extension. While the usage of location data
may be justifiable, that may not always be the case. As such,
the extension should make users aware of when their location
was specifically requested and/or exposed by the website. 
4.3.5. Fingerprinting 
Fingerprinting identifies devices based on characteristics. This
practice can be used in a similar way to session trackers. The
extension should be able to detect device fingerprinting and
inform the user if specific device or personal details were re-
quested as part of this process. 



































































































.4. Detect privacy violations 
he extension shall use the data resulting from the ‘Access,
nalyse, and Present Privacy Policy’ and ’Intercept and Display 
rackers’ requirements to detect discrepancies between the 
tated usage of personal data in privacy policies and actual 
sage through trackers. 
This shall be done on a comparative basis where state- 
ents made in the privacy policy can be compared against the 
ctual result as determined by the extension (e.g. the privacy 
olicy claims cookies are not in use but the extension detects 
he usage of cookies). 
Privacy policy specific privacy violations will also be 
ounted. A privacy policy specific violation could include fail- 
re to mention data security measures or providing no option 
o request a copy of your personal data. The absence of a pri- 
acy policy from a website will be considered as a privacy vi- 
lation. 
The number of violations will be displayed to the user from 
ithin the extension. Full details of each privacy violation 
hall be recorded and presented to the user in the full report 
f findings. 
.5. Full report of findings 
 full report of findings from the extension shall allow users 
o achieve further transparency of use when analysing the 
rivacy impacts of websites. This should put them in a bet- 
er position to make privacy-based decisions. The full report 
hould show the name of the website which it was created 
or and include a timestamp of when it was created. The full 
eport shall include the following sections: Summary of Find- 
ngs, Tracker Count, Tracker Analysis, Privacy Policy Analysis,
nd Additional Information. 
.5.1. Summary of findings 
he first section in the full report shall summarises the track- 
ng data and privacy policy analysis displayed within the ex- 
ension. This will show the same information as is shown in 
he extension to aid clarity and understandability. 
.5.2. Tracker count 
 section showing the number of trackers shall include a 
ount for the following trackers: cookies, local storage, and 
ET/POST requests. 
.5.3. Tracker analysis 
he report shall include a justification for why the extension 
etermined each of the trackers in the ‘Intercept and Display 
rackers’ requirement to be in use or not. For each detected 
racker, at least one justification will be provided. For example,
f location tracking was found to be in use, the justification 
ould be that a request for ‘GPS’ was made by the website. 
.5.4. Privacy policy analysis 
he report shall break down the findings of the privacy policy 
nto smaller categories, and justify whether they have been 
etected in a similar way as Tracker Analysis. The extension 
ill look for – and display to the user – a set of privacy-related 
ata from the privacy policy as outlined in Table 3 .5.5. Additional information 
ny additional information collected by the extension shall 
e displayed to the user including any email addresses found 
ithin the privacy policy, and any violations described in the 
Detect Privacy Violations’ requirement. 
.6. Report privacy violations 
he extension shall list potential privacy violations and pro- 
ide users with the capability to reporting the violation(s) to 
he website. Users will be shown the name of the website they 
re reporting from the extension and a timestamp of when the 
iolation(s) were detected. 
When reporting a violation, the following information will 
e visible to users: Summary of Findings, Additional Informa- 
ion, and Email Creator. 
The Summary of Findings and Additional Information will 
ontain the same information as those described in the ‘Full 
eport of Findings’ requirement. 
.6.1. Email creator 
sers shall be able to create an email from within the exten- 
ion. This will involve entering an email address, a body of 
ext, and allowing the user to send the crafted email from their 
ersonal email account. The email creator shall make the ex- 
erience of writing a privacy violation email easier by provid- 
ng all the necessary information on the same page. 
.7. Privacy summary popup 
 popup shall appear when creating a new account on a web- 
ite. The popup shall display a summary of the websites pri- 
acy policy, allowing the user to make an informed decision 
n whether the privacy implications of using the website out- 
eigh the potential benefits, prior to creating an account. 
The popup will include the same information as deter- 
ined in the ‘Access, Analyse, and Present Privacy Policy’ re- 
uirement including Data Collection, Data Usage, Choices, and 
racking. 
The popup shall add an icon to register buttons on web- 
ites, whereby hovering over this icon will show the popup.
s such, the extension will be able to detect when a user is
reating a new account to show them the popup only when 
elevant. 
.8. Architecture 
.8.1. Extension security 
or the purposes of this extension, security is not to be con- 
idered a primary concern. The extension does not create or 
ntroduce any new behaviour which could compromise the se- 
urity of the user’s device or personal data. Instead, it focuses 
n intercepting data and behaviour which already exists. The 
xtension will also not collect any information on its users 
ither locally or remotely; a privacy policy will be created to 
eflect this (see Section 5.5 ) ( Fig. 1 ). 
During the design and implementation of the extension,
est practices were adhered to; this includes following Google 
hrome’s Extension Security guidelines ( Google, 2020 ). 
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Table 3 – Tracker items. 
Tracking Usability Tracking Analytics Cookie Usage 
Advertising Advertising Recommendations and 
Personalisation 
Data Type Data Types Personal Data Retention 
Collection Direct Data Collection External Data Collection Personal Data Release 
Control Ability to Request Personal 
Data 
Ability to Reject Data 
Collection 
Security Personal Data Security Consequences of Rejecting 
Data Collection 



























4.8.2. Messaging API 
Google Chrome extensions have access to the same API as
the browser, which provides an efficient method of passing
messages between the extension itself and its back-end logic
through the chrome.runtime messaging API. This enables mes-
sages to be sent and retrieved outside the boundary of the ex-
tension and therefore allows for external pages such as the
websites privacy policy to be fetched. 
4.8.3. Versioning 
Semantic versioning practices were followed to ensure consis-
tency. This involves splitting the version into 3 numbers sepa-
rated by a full-stop, e.g. 1.0.2 . The first number is used to define
a major version, the second number is used to define a minor
version, and the third number is used to define the patch ver-
sion. 
4.8.4. Permissions 
Privacy policies are not always stored on the same domain as
the rest of a website, and therefore the extension needs ac-
cess to the ‘ < all_urls > ’ permission, which allows GET/POSTrequests to Cross-Origin Domains. Therefore, the extension
required manual review by Google when uploaded to the
Chrome Web Store, and subsequent reviews each time it is up-
dated. 
5. Design & implementation 
5.1. Extension designs 
In designing the Google Chrome Extension, the name ‘Para-
dox’ was chosen. This was intended to represent the privacy
paradox, and subtly raise awareness to the theory. Three wire-
frame designs were created to be presented to users. The three
designs include different ways of displaying tracking and pri-
vacy policy specific information, offering alternate usability
experiences. 
During the creation of each design, Nielsen’s heuristics for
usability (see Section 2.9 ) were considered and implemented,
to make each design relevant, necessary, and productive for
its prospective audience. 
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Fig. 2 – Paradox extension designs (Wireframe). 


































t  In addition to Nielsen’s heuristics, IBM Design thinking 
pproaches was used to create human-centred design. As 
iscussed in Section 2.9 , this design approach was com- 
ared with others, and it was determined that this approach 
ompliments Nielsen’s heuristics while enforcing a focus on 
ser outcomes. Therefore, a hybrid combination of both ap- 
roaches was followed to ensure that focused, human-centred 
esign remained central to the creation of the extension. Fur- 
her, the first author’s personal experience as a certified IBM 
nterprise Design Thinking Co-Creator was employed to en- 
ure IBM Design thinking approaches were used to ensure de- 
igns meet user expectations. 
By separating layouts from graphics, colours, and images,
 single preferred design could be realistically identified. To 
acilitate this, we used both wireframe and graphical de- 
igns. Wireframes were used to introduce concepts and lay- 
uts ( Fig. 2 ), while graphical representations were used to 
emonstrate potential colour schemes and images ( Fig. 3 ). Par- 
icipants were asked their opinions for the layout of each de- ign - considering effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction 
 after being shown the wireframes, but before being intro- 
uced to the graphical representations. This ensured that par- 
icipants opinions for each design were not influenced by 
raphics. 
All the designs included a banner where the Paradox exten- 
ion logo was be displayed to the user. Additionally, all the de- 
igns featured twin buttons: ’Open Report’ and ’Report Privacy 
iolation’. The appearance of these buttons were unchanged 
n each design as they represented important features of the 
xtension, which enabled functionality. Therefore, it was im- 
ortant to maintain visible continuity. 
The first of the three designs – ‘Design 1’ – used a bold 
isual approach which focuses on expressing the number of 
rackers and warnings as physical numbers to the user. This 
ould enable users to make privacy-based decisions based 
pon the size of the number in each box. 
The second design – ‘Design 2’ – focused on a heavier 
ext-based approach. Each tracking method included an icon,
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which used the ‘traffic light’ metaphor, and was accompanied
with textual rationale. 
The final design – ‘Design 3’ – combined the previous two
designs. It expressed the trackers as physical numbers to-
gether icons for individual tracking methods, and displayed
the privacy policy related data using icons with textual ratio-
nale. 
In addition to the wireframe designs, graphical representa-
tions of each design were created to support the requirements
specified in Section 4 . 
5.2. Popup designs 
Designs for the summative policy analysis popup were also
created in the design process. Two designs were created to
represent different ways in which the policy analysis could be
presented to users. 
The first design – ‘Design 1’ – separated the analysis into 4
categories: ‘Data Collection’, ‘Your Choices’, ‘Data Usage’, and
‘Tracking’ ( Fig. 4 ). Each category had a unique icon with ei-
ther a green tick or an amber warning. The colour red was not
used in this design to encourage users to investigate poten-
tial privacy policy issues, rather than write them off as criti-
cal problems without evaluating. Each category also contained
short sections of text which justify the colour and image of
the icon. The intention of this design was to improve clarity
by using easy to understand headings, enabling non-technical
users to make decisions on privacy-based concerns, easier and
quicker. 
The second design – ‘Design 2’ – addressed 6 separate,
but specific privacy concerns: personal information collection,
the ability to reject data collection, the ability to make an
information request, whether information will be passed to
third-parties, whether cookies are used, and whether analyti-
cal data will be collected. Each concern comprised of an icon
(green tick or amber warning) and justification. This design
was intended to make it clearer to distinguish between im-
portant privacy concerns ( Fig. 4 ). 
5.3. Other designs 
Designs for the ‘Full Report’ and ‘Report Privacy Violation’
pages were created prior to their implementation. Both de-signs contain identical banners for consistency and split the
pages into sections of relevant information to make them eas-
ier to read. 
5.4. Full report 
The ‘Full Report’ page was designed to present a detailed sum-
mary ( Fig. 5 ). The data found and displayed in the Paradox
extension was presented under key-headings, with specific
issues identified under sub-headings. ‘Tracker Analysis’ and
‘Privacy Policy Analysis’ sections shall provide justification for
the explanations provided in the summary. The tracker anal-
ysis was split into: session data; advertising trackers; ad-block
detection; location tracking; and device fingerprinting. Each
section shall contain at least one justification explaining why
the Paradox extension determined that specific tracker to be
prevalent or not. The privacy policy analysis was split into:
advertising; cookies; data release; data retention; data secu-
rity; direct data collection; external data collection; reject data
collection; reject data collection consequence; recommenda-
tions; third party sharing; usability tracking; analytics; and
data types. These factors were chosen as they represent com-
mon themes throughout privacy policies and allowed compar-
ison with relevant laws such as GDPR. For each factor, at least
one justification was displayed to the user. 
5.5. Privacy violation reporter 
The ‘Privacy Violation Reporter’ page design provided a sum-
mary of information collected by the Paradox extension that
provides the user with a method for creating an email on the
same screen ( Fig. 6 ). The design also showed users potential
email addresses they can contact regarding privacy-related is-
sues for the website they are reviewing. In addition, the page
enabled the user to compose an email, which can be sent di-
rectly from the page or copied for sending from the user’s per-
sonal email account. 
5.6. Google chrome web store 
Four graphics were created for use in the Chrome Web Store to
make the Paradox extension look more appealing and demon-
strate functionality. The first of these aimed to summarise
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he core functionality of the Paradox extension, including its 
bility to intercept trackers, analyse privacy policies, and re- 
ort privacy violations ( Fig. 7 ). The second image, depicted in 
ig. 7 , focused on demonstrating the user interface to users 
nd shows the extension and popup interfaces from Version 
.1. 
The images aimed to provide a basic, clear, and informative 
ay for users to understand the simple concepts and func- 
ionality of the extension. Additional detail – including a sec- 
ion on how to use the extension – could be found on the the 
aradox extension website; a link directly to the website is in- 
luded on the Chrome Web Store . Additionally, a direct link to 
he privacy policy was also added, along with a link to email 
upport@privacyparadox.co.uk for additional information. 
.7. Website 
s stated in Section 2.7 , users with access to ‘setup videos,
utorials and/or a website’ had a greater trust in the ex- ension ( Fig. 8 ). Therefore, a website for the extension was 
reated in attempt to achieve this greater trust. The web- 
ite includes an overview of the extension, a page on how 
o use the extension, and a privacy policy. A link to this 
ebsite is provided from the extensions Google Chrome 
eb Store page. The website was created to provide an 
verview of the Paradox extension, as well as some infor- 
ation on how to use it; the site followed the same colour 
cheme and design patterns as the extension designs in 
ig. 3 . 
The homepage showed a clean and simple title, with an 
ption to visit the Google Chrome Web Store to get the exten- 
ion; Fig. 9 provides a quick overview of the key components 
f the extension. 
The ‘Using Paradox’ page is targeted at providing a simple,
isual expression of how to use the extension. Images are used 
o help convey information with arrows pointing towards rel- 
vant information to help users understand and use the ex- 
ension ( Fig. 10 ). 
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Fig. 6 – Paradox report privacy violation page design (Wireframe). 



























5.8. Extension code implementation 
The extension can be split into 3 distinct parts: the logic, the
interface, and injected content. Source code is available via
https://github.com/shortbread31/Paradox . 
The key functionality of the extension was split between
tracking detection, and policy evaluation. Tracking detection
analysis Cross-Origin Requests, Cookies, and Local Storage,
for: session data, ad-focused tracking, ad-block detection, lo-
cation data, and fingerprinting. The occurrences of each track-
ing method were counted and displayed to the user. Privacy
policy evaluation finds and analyses the privacy policy of
the website to create a summary of the number of warnings
(where data is being collected, used, or shared) and violations
(where the policy is either in breach of GDPR, or contradicts
actual data collection). The extension also added a popup to the ‘Create Account’
and ‘Register’ buttons, which displayed a summary of the
analysis of the privacy policy. This provides users with a sum-
mative analysis of the policy prior to completing account cre-
ation. This is not intended to replace the ideal scenario of
reading a privacy policy in full, rather it is a means to aid the
process. However, it is anticipated that users may choose to
use the popup to replace the necessity of reading the entire
privacy policy. 
An option to view a full report of findings opened an exter-
nal webpage with a detailed report of all analysis carried out
by the extension. The full report was intended to help techni-
cal users make privacy-based decisions when the base infor-
mation provided by the extension is not enough. Furthermore,
the additional data captured and presented in the full report
could be used for reporting a violation. 
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There was an option to report a violation from the exten- 
ion, which may be recommended to users upon discovering 
rivacy violations. To report a violation, a new window was be 
pened, which provides users with the relevant email address 
or the website, and the findings from the extension. This en- 
bles users to build an email template, which can then be sent 
n from their personal email address. 
.9. Extension algorithms 
he logic of the extension handled the collection of trackers,
nd analysis of the privacy policy, as well as injecting a script 
nto the webpage to intercept cross-origin communications; 
he majority of this is carried out in a content script. 
Cookies and local storage were obtained by making re- 
uests to document storage objects, and were added to an ob- 
ect which could be sent to the extension interface. The inter- 
ace was sent this object once the user attempts to open it and 
ent updates if the object changes. 
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The location of the privacy policy was determined by
searching the webpage for the term ‘privacy’ within the sites
anchor tags and retrieved the full address if found. A get re-
quest was performed on this address and the result (the pri-
vacy policy webpage as a string) was parsed. 
To parse the policy, a search list of common terms was used
to identify common themes (e.g. the string ‘we share infor-
mation about you’ would be detected as third-party sharing)
as indicated in Fig. 11 . Once parsing was complete, an object
was created. Each common theme had a true or false value,
which defined whether that theme was found within the pol-
icy; where a theme was found, an additional parameter ‘data’
was returned containing all of the strings identified by the
search list for this theme; these are shown in Fig. 12 . 
5.10. Interface 
Once opened, the interface received the most recent results
from the logic as an object. The interface then analysed the
object and searched for keywords such as ‘fingerprint’. The
results of the analysis were then rendered; where a match is
found, a warning and justification were displayed, and where
no match is found, a green tick and explanation was shown. The privacy policy object was analysed and, where at least
1 warning is found (e.g. the policy makes no mention of per-
sonal data security measures), a warning was displayed to
the user. The interface also analysed the privacy policy ob-
ject comparatively with identified keywords to determine if
there were any discrepancies between the policy and actual
data collection, then – if found – displayed a warning to the
user. 
5.11. Injected content 
The content injected a script into the webpage to intercept
GET/POST requests, which could then be parsed by the inter-
face. This must be done outside of the extensions as direct
access to the website code is required to intercept and cap-
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ure data in transmission. The script neither stopped nor pre- 
ented requests from taking place, it only captured them once 
hey have been transmitted. 
.12. Popup code implementation 
s the popup is rendered onto the webpage, it was imple- 
ented outside of the extension, and was handled by the 
ame script intercepting GET/POST requests. The parsed pri- 
acy policy object was sent to the script from the logic, which 
as analysed, and relevant data was added to the popup.
o display the popup, the script searched for a button ele- 
ent referencing the term ‘register’, and other similar terms.
f found, the paradox logo was drawn on top of the button and 
ould be hovered over to display the policy analysis. 
.13. Requirements fulfilment 
he ‘Extension Specifications’ requirement in Section 4.1 ex- 
ressed six requirements for the extension: ‘Access, Analyse,
nd Present Privacy Policy’ (R1); ‘Intercept and Display Track- 
rs’ (R2); ‘Detect Privacy Violations’ (R3), ‘Full Report of Find- 
ngs’ (R4); ‘Report Privacy Violations’ (R5); and ‘Privacy Sum- 
ary Popup’ (R6). 
In Fig. 11 , a method for accessing and analysing the privacy 
olicy is demonstrated. This shows that R1 has been satisfied.
Script injection was used to intercept trackers on active 
ebpages. This data was then presented within the extension,
hereby fulfilling R2. 
Once the extension popup had received the privacy policy 
nalysis from the content script, the results of the analysis 
ere used to determine if any violations were prevalent. The ode below demonstrates how a privacy violation can be de- 
ected: 
Privacy violations were shown within the extension, and 
sers could read full descriptions in the full report and privacy 
iolation reporter, fulfilling R3. Two additional pages were cre- 
ted to display further, specific information and provide addi- 
ional functionality in line with R4 and R5. These are the full 
eport and privacy violation reporter pages. Finally, popup de- 
igns were created and implemented as specified by R6. 
. Evaluation 
ormative evaluation was carried out on the extension de- 
igns from a usability perspective. This evaluation fed directly 
nto the development of the extension, prior to any summa- 
ive evaluation taking place. Summative evaluation of the ex- 
ension took place in focus groups once feedback from forma- 
ive evaluation has been quantified and incorporated. 
A total of 41 participants took part in the design survey; 
5% of the participants stated they were technically compe- 
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tent. For the extension, Design 2 ( Fig. 2 ) was determined to be
the preferred design and for the popup, Design 1. ( Fig. 4 ) was
preferred overall. 
6.1. Formative design evaluation 
To ensure that the survey would both appeal and be relevant to
a wide user base, the survey was designed to provide contex-
tual understanding for the extension. Participants were pro-
vided with the purpose of the extension, where it would exist
within the web browser interface, and how they could inter-
act with it. The formative evaluation participants have been
labelled from FP1 to FP41. 
Designs for the full analysis report and privacy violation
reporter were not created for the survey. This was to ensure a
high quality of response by keeping the length of the survey asshort as possible to maintain attention. The designs for these
elements of the extension followed the design requirements
elicited from the survey to maintain a fluent user experience.
The questions in the survey were mixed between direct
and open questions; where a specific response was desired,
a closed question was asked (e.g. ‘Of these designs, which do
you think is the most effective, efficient, and satisfactory?’)
and where open-minded thinking was desired, an open ques-
tion was asked (e.g. ‘If you could make this design better, what
would you change?’). 
The survey was split into 4 sections: background informa-
tion, extension designs (wireframe), extension designs (graph-
ical), and popup designs. 
The survey results can be downloaded from https:
//figshare.com/articles/dataset/Privacy _ Extension _ Design _ 
Survey _ csv/12652883 . 
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.1.1. Background information 
he background information section explained the context 
f the Paradox extension to the participant and asked them 
hether they consider themselves to be technical or non- 
echnical. This identified whether there are differences in de- 
ign requirements for technical and non-technical users. 
.1.2. Extension designs (Wireframe) 
n this section, participants were shown the three wireframe 
esigns, and are asked if each is effective, efficient, and satis- 
actory. Participants were then asked which single design ap- 
lies these three principles the best. 
Open ended questions were asked to determine why 
heir preferred design was better than the others, and what 
hey would change to improve on it. These questions were 
esigned to elicit thought-provoking responses which may 
resent information that has not been considered during the 
esign process. 
.1.3. Extension designs (Graphical) 
his section focused on the colour scheme of the designs, and 
etermined whether images were clear. For each design, par- 
icipants were asked whether the colour scheme makes the 
ontent readable, and whether the images and their meanings 
eree clear. 
Participants were then asked if their opinion of the most 
ffective, efficient, and satisfactory design has changed, and 
sked the same open questions from Section 6.1.2 . 
.1.4. Popup designs 
n this section, participants were presented with 2 popup de- 
igns and their context for use. The questions asked were the 
ame as those in Section 6.1.2 , while referring to the popup 
esigns instead. .1.5. Findings 
f the 41 participants, 10 (24.4%) claimed to be non-technical 
nd 31 (75.6%) claimed to be technical ( Fig. 13 ). Considering 
ow ubiquitous web browsers has become, this result is not 
urprising. Nonetheless, the sample size from each group was 
till large enough to draw comparisons on design preferences 
etween non-technical and technical users. 
Participants were asked about the effectiveness, efficiency,
nd satisfaction of each design. Design 2 ( Fig. 2 ) was rated as
oth the most effective and efficient but received the lowest 
ating for satisfaction, whereas Design 3 ( Fig. 2 ) had the most
atisfactory design ( Fig. 14 ). 
When asked for an overall favourite, the participants re- 
ected the result of the previous question, with 43.9% choos- 
ng Design 2 ( Fig. 2 ). 
Participants reasoning for their chosen design was focused 
n understandability, e.g. “Clearer to understand and a lot easier 
n the eyes ” [FP4], “Simpler to understand ” [FP28], and “The easiest 
o understand at first glance ” [FP19]. It was commented “what 
oes the box ‘CORS’ mean: Cross-origin resource sharing? Non- 
echnical like me would not understand what this actually means.
esign 2, although looks busy, actually identifies areas of concern 
FP27]”. 
Participants made the following suggestions: “Perhaps a 
utton to switch between ‘basic’ and ‘detailed’ information ” [FP30],
Add information bubbles when the cursor is placed over each 
tem ” [FP13], and “Highlight what the images represent...Are they 
etaphors? ” [FP11]. 
When asked whether the colour schemes demonstrated in 
he graphical representations made it easier to read the con- 
ent, Design 2 ( Fig. 2 ) and Design 3 ( Fig. 2 ) both received very
ositive results, with 37 out of the 41 participants agreeing in 
oth cases. However, Design 1 ( Fig. 2 ) received a lower score,
ith only 30 out of the 41 participants agreeing that the colour 
cheme improved the readability of the design (see Fig. 15 ). 
Participants found that the images were far clearer and 
asier to understand in Design 2 ( Fig. 2 ) when compared to the
ther designs; 36 of the 41 participants said that the images in 
his design were clear (see Fig. 16 ). 
Participants conclusively decided that Design 2 ( Fig. 2 ) 
as the most effective, efficient, and satisfactory design af- 
er seeing both the wireframe and graphical designs. In total,
6.1% of participants chose this as their preferred design (see 
ig. 17 ). 
Some participants explained that they were red/green 
olour-blind and that the second design was the only one 
hich they could understand due to the explanations next to 
ach icon. Other comments included: “Maybe explain why it’s 
n two sections by just like subheadings ” [FP19], “Provide a graphi- 
al/textual distinction between ”good ” and “bad ” - colour on its own 
s insufficient. I’d suggest you have a green tick or red cross super-
mposed over a grey icon to indicate success or failure - if you can’t
ell the difference without colour, it’s a poor UI ” [FP39], “Could the 
o privacy issues found change colour at some point so it’s clearer ”
FP5], and “Use amber for warnings not red. Red looks like you are
lready in big trouble on this page ” [FP2] ( Fig. 18 ). 
Participants believed that Design 1 ( Fig. 4 ) was more effi- 
ient and satisfactory than Design 2 ( Fig. 4 ). For effectiveness,
he results for each design were very similar, with 31 and 32,
espectively. 
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Fig. 13 – Technical and non-technical participants. 
Fig. 14 – Effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction of wireframe extension designs. 
Fig. 15 – The most effective, efficient, and satisfactory wireframe extension design. 
Fig. 16 – Effect of colour scheme on readability. 
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Fig. 17 – Image meaning understandability. 
Fig. 18 – The most effective, efficient, and satisfactory extension design. 






















Section 6.3 . The preferred popup design was Design 1 ( Fig. 4 ). However,
he result was very close, with 56.1% of participants preferring 
t (see Fig. 19 ). 
Participants made the following comments on the popup 
esigns: “Maybe have a box that gives the software’s over all opin- 
on on its safety as a summary of the four boxes ” [FP19], and “This 
s effectively giving users permission not to read the T&C document 
rovided because you’ve summarised it for them. Does that make 
ou responsible if there is a privacy breach if there is something in 
he T&C that you have told the user is ok? I know most people don’t
ead the T&C anyway but be careful about taking that responsibility 
or them.” [FP15] ( Fig. 20 ). .2. Summative evaluation - pilot 
 pilot of the focus group was carried out with a sin- 
le participant. The aim of the pilot was to ensure the re- 
ote meeting presentation software was suitable and de- 
ermine whether the structure and quality of the evalua- 
ion material was suitable for eliciting relevant and use- 
ul responses from the participants. The participant in- 
olved was of a technical background and was not in- 
olved in any further evaluation, nor have their responses 
een included in the results from the focus groups in 
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6.2.1. Pilot findings 
The pilot determined several issues with the evaluation ma-
terial, which were: Lack of Context, Misunderstanding Expec-
tations, and Lack of Images. 
6.2.2. Lack of context 
The initial evaluation material provided very little context
about the study, privacy, privacy policies, or tracking prior to
introducing questions on those topics. The pilot participant
found it difficult to understand or relate to some of the ques-
tions given that they had no prior knowledge of these topics.
As a result of this, additional slides were added to introduce
privacy, privacy policies, tracking, and provide context of the
study itself. 
6.2.3. Misunderstanding expectations 
A very brief introduction to privacy expectations was given to
the pilot participant. However – when asked what their privacy
expectations were when using the web – they were unsure of
how to answer the question. This was partly due to the lack of
context [6.2.2] , but also because only a limited amount of de-
tail on privacy expectations was provided. This was improved
by adding additional slides to cover privacy expectations in
depth, and by talking about them as a group, rather than ask-
ing about them directly. 
6.2.4. Lack of images 
While the pilot participant claimed that the user interface of
the Paradox extension was simple and easy to pick up, they
found it difficult to relate the information they were being
given about the extension with it at the time. The partici-
pant explained that having images of the extension and talk-
ing about each section directly would clear up any potential
misunderstandings. As a result of this, images of the exten-
sion were added to the presentation slides and were delivered
with a direct explanation during the focus groups. 
6.2.5. Pilot observations 
During the pilot, the participant showed concern over some of
the data types being collected and was particularly concerned
that all the websites they visited claimed to share personal
data with third parties. In contrast, the participant was notconcerned about analytic data collection or any given conse-
quences to rejecting data collection, such as preventing a user
from adding an item to their basket on an e-commerce web-
site if they reject data collection, although they did suggest
that the latter was morally wrong to do. 
Interestingly, the participant suggested that the Paradox
extension had changed their opinion of not only the sites they
visited, but other sites as well. Their reasoning was that now
they were aware of the ways the tested websites were using
their personal data, they expected that similar websites would
do the same thing. As a result, the participant said their expec-
tations have changed after using the Paradox extension, but
not just for the websites visited while using the extension. 
Based on these findings an additional question, covering
changes in expectations for websites which were not visited
during the focus group, was added. This was to determine
whether a similar pattern would be repeatable among partic-
ipants. In addition to this, the format of the evaluation was
changed whereby participants were offered the opportunity
to participate in a follow-up interview a week after their focus
group; participants were made aware that this was optional. 
6.3. Summative evaluation - focus groups 
Due to the emergence of COVID-19 in Spring 2020, fo-
cus groups had to be rearranged to take place remotely.
Rather than meeting in-person, remote meeting presentation
software was used to connect participants. The responses
from participants were reviewed through an informal the-
matic analysis based on an affinity diagram style feedback-
grid ( IBM Studios, 2016 ). 
6.3.1. Focus group participants 
Four focus groups were conducted, each with 5 participants
(Groups A to D). Small groups were used to ensure that every-
body was able to speak and provide quality data while adher-
ing to a reasonable timeframe. Two of the groups were made
up of non-technical participants, while the other two groups
were made up of technical participants. 
Participants were recruited primarily based on their tech-
nical ability, and were recruited via their educational work or
current employer; the technicality of participants was deter-
mined based on a combination of a self-assessment by each
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Table 4 – Focus group participant numbers. 
Technical Non-Technical 
Group A Group B Group C Group D 
SP1, SP2, SP3, SP4, SP5, 
SP6 






























































































articipant and the consideration of their expertise, includ- 
ng their current and previous employment roles, and prior 
ducation. The demographic information of participants was 
onsidered with a balance of participants from each bracket 
such as age and gender) in each group. 
All four focus groups were successfully carried out, taking 
etween 50 min and 1 h 7 min. Of the 20 initial participants,
ne [non-technical participant] was unable to take part due 
o technical difficulties when joining via the online meeting 
oftware. A further participant was unable to participate dur- 
ng their allocated time slot, but participated in a later group 
nstead. 
A PowerPoint presentation was created as a visual aid for 
articipants during the focus group. The slides were displayed 
ia the meeting presentation software to participants during 
he focus groups. 
.3.2. Participant information 
he summative evaluation participants were labelled from 
P1 to SP19, where SP1 to SP10 were technical participants and 
P11 to SP19 were non-technical participants ( Table 4 ). 
.3.3. User expectations 
articipants were asked about their privacy expectations 
hen using the web. These expectations were broken down 
nto the four categories specified in the ‘Access, Analyse, and 
resent Privacy Policy’ requirement. 
Almost all the participants made it clear that they had 
ot considered their privacy expectations before, and several 
tated that they “don’t have any ”. Only once they were intro- 
uced to different aspects of their privacy exposure, such as 
he personal information being collected on them, did they 
egin to consider what their expectations might be. 
.3.4. Personal information 
cross the focus groups, both non-technical and technical 
articipants were generally quite restrictive about the per- 
onal data which they wanted to be collected. Around half of 
he participants accepted that some basic information such 
s their name, age, and gender could be collected freely. The 
ther half stipulated that without specific consent and pur- 
ose, no personal information should be collected at all, e.g. “I 
ould expect the basics ” [SP8], “I have a very negative opinion of per- 
onal data collection completely, I always assume the worst although 
 don’t know what the worst actually is ” [SP9], and “I wouldn’t ex- 
ect any of that [Personal] information to be taken unless it was 
eeded for a specific purpose ” [SP6]. 
.3.5. Device information 
lmost all of the participants across the focus groups sug- 
ested that they were happy for basic information such as evice type, browser type and IP address to be collected, as 
ong as it was for the purpose of improving their user experi- 
nce [by rendering content which is suitable for their device]; 
I would [expect this] if it makes a difference to how the page is being
endered ” [SP6]. A small number of participants said that they 
id not expect device information to be gathered at all, e.g. “It’s 
omething I hadn’t even thought about which I now have to worry 
bout even more ” [SP9] and “I can’t see what device information has 
o do with them ” [SP10]. 
.3.6. Financial information 
ll the participants agreed that financial information should 
ot be collected unless their permission had been explicitly 
iven, and then destroyed immediately afterwards. They also 
tated that this information should only extend to the mini- 
um amount required to complete the relevant transaction; 
[websites should only collect] the minimum amount of information 
hey need to make a transaction ” [SP19]. Some participants also 
uggested that financial information should be instantly de- 
troyed after a transaction by default, e.g. “I personally don’t 
ike websites keeping that data ” [SP5] and“it should be destroyed 
fterwards ” [SP12]. Contextually, all participants agreed that 
 website which has no intention of selling you something 
hould not be collecting this type of information, while web- 
ites which were being used to sell products/services should 
e allowed this information temporarily, and only when pro- 
ided directly by them. 
.3.7. Information on others 
n general, the participants all agreed that social media web- 
ites obtaining information about their friends, family and 
thers was acceptable, but stated that other types of websites 
hould have no justification for collecting this type of infor- 
ation and therefore shouldn’t be collecting it at all, e.g. “I 
ouldn’t have really expected that unless it was a website like Face- 
ook ” [SP9] and “It’s down to the website ” [SP19]. One focus group 
ad a slightly different opinion, collectively stating that this 
ype of information should “absolutely not ” [SP11] be collected 
nd that it was “none of their business ” [SP12]. 
.3.8. Selling or sharing with third parties 
oth non-technical focus groups made it clear that they were 
ntirely unhappy with the concept of third party sharing and 
id not want it to happen unless they had explicitly agreed to 
t, e.g. “I don’t want them to [sell or share my information] ” [SP17]. 
In contrast, both technical groups made it clear that they 
ere aware that third party sharing was a common practice 
nd something they had become used to, thereby suggesting 
hat they had come to expect it, e.g. “I assume they’re always 
elling and sharing my information with third parties ” [SP9] and 
Third party sharing is just something that happens ” [SP7]. De- 
pite this some of the technical participants made it clear that 




























































































they were not happy with third party sharing despite accept-
ing and expecting it, e.g. “it’s really annoying ” [SP5]. Members
of the technical groups tended to show more concern about
who the third parties were and what data they had rather than
concern for the practice of third party sharing itself, e.g. “You’d
probably have to do quite a bit of digging to find out the specific com-
panies [whom your data is being shared with] ” [SP8]. 
6.3.9. Recommending products/services 
Typically, participants accepted the usage of their data to
recommend them products/services. Some participants sug-
gested that it can be a good thing as long the recommenda-
tions felt suitable and were relevant, e.g. “it’s a business tactic
to get you to buy more, and it is useful sometimes ” [SP10] and “when
it’s being used appropriately, it’s useful ” [SP4]. 
SP17 – who was very unhappy about this type of data usage
– said “if I buy a present for my wife on the internet and she uses the
same laptop, she’ll see what I’m buying her ”. This demonstrates
a way in which this type of data usage is not only invasive for
some people, but also undesirable. 
6.3.10. Data security 
Technical participants were concerned with their personal
data security in general and suggested that they assumed ev-
ery website they visit is insecure. Despite this, they said that
their expectations were that relevant laws are followed to keep
personal data secure, while admitting that they were not too
sure if this happened in practice, e.g. “There’s a lot of laws and
regulations in place and you kind of hope that they’re being followed,
but you don’t really know. There’s not much [clarity] on websites I’ve
seen, I just hope it’s okay ” [SP7] and “I just assume everything is in-
secure ” [SP10]. SP1 and SP3 suggested that while personal data
security measures should be transparent to users, too much
information could compromise security and that finding a bal-
ance was key, e.g. “a brief overview should be provided, but nothing
which can compromise themselves ” [SP3]. 
Non-technical participants explained that they wanted it
to be clearer to them that their data was going to be kept se-
cure, e.g. “I think websites should be telling you what they’re do-
ing ” [SP17]. However, they said that they often trusted websites
without any justification and would not read about their per-
sonal data security even if it was made transparent to them,
e.g. “I think it should be on there somewhere, but I think you should
have to go looking for it. If I go on to a website, I’m not going to read
everything they do to protect my security before I actually do what
I want to do ” [SP18]. SP16 suggested, “In a nicer world [I would
assume that websites take steps to make security measures trans-
parent], but they probably don’t ”. 
6.3.11. Requesting a copy of personal information 
All the participants agreed that they should be able to re-
quest a copy of their personal information though some said
that they had never thought about or considered doing so and
therefore had no real expectation towards the capability of do-
ing it, e.g. “You should always be able to view your personal infor-
mation ” SP7 and “I don’t even think about it to be honest ” [SP11].
Some participants also suggested that the option should be
made clearer or that they should simply be able to access a
copy of all their personal information from a website withouthaving to make a request for it, e.g. “I want to be able to see it,
but I don’t want to have to request it ” [SP13]. 
6.3.12. Rejecting data collection 
All the participants agreed that they should have the choice to
reject data collection, and that the capability to do so should
be made clearer or easier to access, e.g. “I think you should be
able to [request a copy of your personal information] but you don’t
seem to be able to ” [SP9] and “I don’t know how you would go about
doing that ” [SP7]. Many of the participants from non-technical
and technical backgrounds suggested that rejecting data col-
lection might have undesirable consequences on the websites,
or that they simply would not be able to use them anymore.
SP3 went further and suggested that websites which allow
users to reject data collection should have the choice to turn
users away if they decided to do so; if the business cannot
make money without collecting your personal information,
the participant considered this a valid reason to turn users
away. SP6 agreed with this: “it depends on the business model of
the website, which should be made clear ”. 
6.3.13. Personalised advertising 
Most participants were content with personalised advertis-
ing trackers, with some suggesting that it can often be use-
ful; SP7 agreed, saying, “I think personalised advertising is a good
thing ”. SP10 commented that they did not like it when they
were shown “irrelevant adverts ” and SP8 agreed, saying “some-
times when I search for one thing, I get lots of ads I don’t want ”
while SP5 suggested they did not like that this type of track-
ing, which could be used to increase prices on items they had
recently searched for on other websites. 
6.3.14. Cookies 
All the participants accepted cookies, and understood that
they could be useful. The participants made it clear that they
were only comfortable with cookies if they were only collect-
ing relevant data which would not be shared or sold e.g. “It’s
quite useful to go back to a website and have what you were doing re-
sume from the time before ” [SP6] and “I don’t like cookies that track
you across various websites ” [SP17]; SP17 added that they did not
mind cookies which were used to restore website sessions. 
One of the non-technical focus groups expressed concerns
that cookies affect the performance of their device, e.g. “they
clog up my computer and I have to clear them all the time ” [SP12].
This behaviour suggests that the security and privacy con-
cerns associated with cookies are not necessarily considered,
and – in some cases – performance concerns take precedence.
6.3.15. Analytics 
Generally, all the participants agreed that they were comfort-
able with analytics being used, e.g. “it can be a good thing, but
it also depends on what they pull out while they’re doing it ” [SP9].
However, SP11 described their usage as being “nosey ”. SP9 was
unaware that analytic data was collected at all but considered
that it would not have a negative impact on their personal user
experience; SP7 added “I didn’t know mouse tracking was a thing,
that’s interesting to know ”. 






































































































.3.16. Usability tracking 
ll the participants were content with usability tracking tak- 
ng place, with many suggesting that it was a good thing and 
eneficial for them in the long-term, e.g. “that is a good thing,
bsolutely ” [SP9] and “it’ll help to make the website more accessible ”
SP15]. As such, the participants collectively decided that they 
oth expected and wanted websites to use usability tracking. 
.3.17. Expectations on Amazon 
articipants were asked whether their expectations were dif- 
erent for Amazon; the results were mixed. 
One of the non-technical groups was more concerned 
bout Amazon due to the number of services and devices they 
ffer. In contrast. the other focus group collectively suggested 
hat they were more trusting of Amazon compared with other 
ebsites, and that they would therefore be more lenient with 
hem if any of their expectations were not met. Both non- 
echnical focus groups made it clear that they still had the 
ame expectations, despite admitting that they expected the 
eality to differ from their expectations. 
Of the two technical groups, one collectively suggested that 
hey expected Amazon to take a larger amount of financial in- 
ormation but that otherwise their expectations remained the 
ame. The other technical group said that their expectations 
ere the same, and SP4 went further, saying that “I expect them 
o be better as I see them as role models. They should be demonstrat- 
ng appropriate use of data [as] they have a responsibility ”. 
.3.18. Expectations on Facebook 
articipants were asked whether their expectations were dif- 
erent for Facebook. Across all the groups, everyone believed 
hat Facebook would collect more information and do more 
ith it. 
The non-technical focus groups both said that they ex- 
ected Facebook to be less secure than other websites. One 
f these groups also agreed that they had lower expectations 
f Facebook overall with both SP15 and SP16 admitting that 
hey did not use Facebook at all as a result of this. 
In the technical groups, SP9 said they did not use Facebook 
ue to concerns over how their data would be used. One user 
lso reiterated his earlier statement, suggesting that like Ama- 
on, Facebook is a role model and that their behaviour should 
emonstrate this. 
.3.19. Paradox results on Amazon 
articipants were asked to use the Paradox extension on Ama- 
on and consider the results from the full report feature, the 
esults are listed in Table 5 . 
.3.20. Paradox results on Facebook 
articipants were asked to use the Paradox extension on Face- 
ook and look at the results from the full report feature 
 Table 6 ). 
.3.21. Extent of expectations met 
ased on the results from the Paradox extension Results on 
mazon and Facebook, a table summarising the areas in 
hich expectations were and were not met was produced; 
ells where at least 50% of participants expectations were not 
et have been highlighted in red ( Table 7 ). The ‘combined’ ells calculate the combined number of non-technical and 
echnical users whose expectations were met. 
The table indicates some interesting patterns, including: 
isconnected Expectations of Data Types, Amazon met fewer 
xpectations than Facebook, and Differences in Third Party 
haring Expectations. 
.3.22. Disconnected expectations of data types 
cross every group, ‘Data Types’ was the only category to not 
eet a single participants expectation on both Amazon and 
acebook. None of the participants believed that the data be- 
ng collected on them met their expectations and every par- 
icipant was shocked or surprised at the amount of data being 
ollected, and how intrusive some of it was. Many participants 
ere also concerned about how unnecessary much of the data 
ppeared to be. 
.3.23. Amazon met fewer Expectations than Facebook 
verall, Amazon met user expectations 67% of the time 
hile Facebook met user expectations 84% of the time. Ama- 
on scored particularly badly with the non-technical groups; 
hose expectations were only met 62% of the time. 
When compared to Facebook, users were particularly un- 
appy with Amazon’s policy on releasing personal data; no 
articipants said that this met their expectations. In contrast,
acebook said that it did not release any personal information.
Amazon also fell short of user’s expectations for ‘Data Re- 
ention’ with only 16% of users stating that this met their ex- 
ectations compared with 100% on Facebook. Furthermore,
articipants felt their expectations were not being met by 
mazon’s ‘External Data Collection’, with it only meeting ex- 
ectations 32% of the time across non-technical and technical 
sers. 
Finally, non-technical users were unhappy that Amazon 
ould prevent them from using core services if they chose 
o reject personal data collection; this met only 22% of non- 
echnical user’s expectations. 
A combination of the above factors may contribute to ex- 
laining why Facebook received a much higher score than 
mazon. In addition to these factors, it is worth consider- 
ng that there may be slight differences in expectations as 
escribed in ’Expectations on Amazon’ and ’Expectations on 
acebook’. 
.3.24. Differences in third party sharing expectations 
he results show that non-technical users had higher ex- 
ectations for third party sharing. For Amazon, 0% of non- 
echnical participants said their expectations had been met,
hile 60% of technical participants expectations were met.
 similar pattern was visible on Facebook where only 22% 
f non-technical users said their expectations towards ’Third 
arty Sharing’ had been met, but 100% of technical users 
greed that their expectations were met. 
This demonstrates a clear difference in expectations, and 
hows that the non-technical participants were far less ac- 
epting of third party sharing than the technical participants.
.3.25. Violation reporting 
articipants were asked to browse the web and look at a few 
ebsites with the Paradox extension to determine whether 
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Table 5 – Evaluation results on Amazon. 
Evaluation Participant Response 
On Amazon, the Paradox extension detected 
different numbers of trackers for each 
participant. As a collective, there were typically 
30–800 trackers detected; SP18 however, found 
232 trackers detected by the Paradox extension, 
with 221 of these in Local Storage. 
The non-technical groups were generally very concerned by the number of 
trackers in use with SP17 asking, “Why do they need so many? ” and “What are they 
tracking? ”. Collectively the participants agreed that there were more trackers in 
use than they thought there would be, although SP11 and SP13 admitted that 
they “didn’t know what to expect ”. 
One of the technical groups said that despite there being more trackers than 
expected, they were not particularly surprised. The other technical group agreed 
that they had expected large number of trackers and that they were not 
surprised with the results. 
The Paradox extension detected that Amazon 
was using third party advertising, advertising, 
and interest-based ads. 
All four groups collectively agreed that they both expected this, and that they 
were comfortable with it. 
The Paradox extension detected that Amazon 
was using cookies and unique identifiers on its 
website. 
All four groups agreed that they expected this, with SP19 suggesting that cookie 
usage was “pretty normal ”. However, SP17 added that they were not necessarily 
comfortable with it, using the word “unfortunately ”. 
The Paradox extension detected that Amazon 
releases account information and exchanges 
information with others. Data release is the 
practice of releasing information to a company 
or individual without notice or consent. 
None of the participants (technical or non-technical) were happy about this and 
it did not meet their expectations, e.g. “A bit too ambiguous ” [SP12] and “I’m not 
happy with that ” [SP11]. They were especially concerned with the ambiguity and 
that it was not clear what data could be released and SP7 suggested that “they’re 
very vague with the wording, it’s very illusive ”. SP6 said they were “very worried ”
while many others said they were “not happy ”. 
The Paradox extension found that Amazon 
retains personal data for ‘as long as is required’. 
All the participants said that they did not mind their data being retained. 
However, they all expressed concern over the ambiguity in the term ‘as long as it 
is required’, e.g. “as long as it is required’ is very vague ” [SP9] and “it’s just a bit 
vague ” [SP2]. SP17 questioned whether the data was being held for as long as 
required by Amazon, or if it was held for as long as required by the user, 
asking,“who’s definition of ‘as long as required’? ”; SP15 added, “required by you or 
required by them? ”. Participants suggested that they were uncomfortable with the 
idea that Amazon could retain their personal information for as long as Amazon 
deemed to require it; there were suggestions that the specific criteria for 
retaining this information should be made transparent. 
The Paradox extension detected that Amazon 
has a range of security measures in place to 
protect personal information. 
All the participants said that they were happy with this result and that this had 
met their expectations, e.g. “it’s all positive by the indicators - the green ticks ” [SP17]. 
None of the participants indicated that Amazon’s policy on data retention had 
changed their opinion on data security. Further to this, participants did not 
seem to consider the fact that their data could be released by Amazon, thereby 
making data security effectively redundant. 
The Paradox extension detected that Amazon 
was collecting information which was provided 
by the user. 
All the participants said that this met their expectations and that they were 
happy with this, assuming the information being requested was the minimum 
required for its purpose. SP3 was slightly more specific and stated that they were 
happy with this “depending on the information ” which was being collected. 
External data collection was detected on 
Amazon by the Paradox extension. This 
consisted of information which was provided to 
Amazon from other sources. 
The non-technical groups both expressed that they were displeased with this, 
e.g. “this makes me uncomfortable ” [SP15], “did not expect that ” [SP12], and “why 
would they do that? ” [SP11]. SP19 added, “It means you don’t really know who’s got 
what data on you ”. However, SP3 said that “it depends on the type of data ” and 
suggested that they would be happy with some specific acceptable use of 
external data collection. 
The technical groups both agreed that their expectations were based on the 
context of data being provided from other sources. They agreed that in some 
cases external data collection can be necessary, but suggested they were worried 
about how external data collection would be used on Amazon, e.g. “when it comes 
to the financial side they have to do that don’t they? I’m not sure I’m happy with other 
things but there’s things you expect there and things you might not expect depending on 
what kind of things it is they’re getting from other sources ” [SP9]. 
Amazon states clearly in its policy that users can 
make an information request, as is expected 
under GDPR legislation. 
Across all four focus groups, the participants agreed that this met their 
expectations, e.g. “you should be able to ” [SP16]. 
The Paradox extension detected that Amazon 
used the personal data it collects to recommend 
features and personalise user experience when 
using their website. 
Three of the four focus groups were happy with this as they felt it met their 
expectations, e.g. “I’d rather see ads that are relevant if I have to see ads ” [SP18]. 
However, in one of the non-technical focus groups there was a mixed response. 
Generally, this group believed that recommendations were okay sometimes but 
usually found them intrusive. 
( continued on next page ) 
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Table 5 ( continued ) 
Evaluation Participant Response 
Amazon provides its users with the capability to 
reject data collection when using its services. 
Users can choose not to provide their personal 
information, withdraw their consent, or opt out, 
and object to the processing of their personal 
information. 
Both non-technical groups were pleased with this and stated that it met their 
expectations. In the technical groups there was a slightly more varied response; 
while all the participants were pleased, SP9 said that they had not expected 
Amazon to do this. SP3 suggested that while this was a good thing, the option to 
reject data collection was not obvious enough and that users should be made 
more aware of how to access this capability and added, “it’s only good if it’s easy to 
find ”. 
At Amazon, the Paradox extension detected that 
there were consequences to rejecting data 
collection. These consequences included “not 
being able to take advantage ” of Amazons services, 
and “not being able to add items to your shopping 
basket ”. In effect, these consequences are 
designed to force people to accept data 
collection if they want to use Amazon. 
In the non-technical focus groups, only 22% of the participants expected that 
there would be a consequence to rejecting data collection. Despite this, none of 
the participants were happy that they would not be able to use Amazon without 
accepting data collection; the groups both labelled it as “morally wrong ” and SP16 
said “If you reject it you’re stuffed then aren’t you? ”. 
In the technical groups, 40% of the participants were unhappy with this and SP9 
suggested that “we can’t use it then ”. The other participants agreed that Amazon 
was within their right to do this and SP1 reasoned that “[Amazon] needs your data 
to check out, so this could be a functional requirement ”. 
The Paradox extension detected that Amazon 
communicates with third-partied in a multitude 
of ways. Amazon states in its privacy policy that 
it might ’sell or buy’ or ’share’ information and 
states that ’third parties are involved in your 
transactions’. 
In the non-technical focus groups, all of the participants were notably shocked 
by this having previously stated in the ‘Selling or Sharing with Third Parties; 
expectation that they did not expect third party sharing to occur on any website 
without explicit consent, e.g. “[third party sharing] certainly doesn’t meet 
expectations, I didn’t think Amazon would go quite that far ” [SP17] and “I’m not happy 
with this, it’s too far ” [SP11]. 
In contrast, both technical groups unanimously admitted that they expected 
third party sharing to occur, e.g. “other parties sell through Amazon, so they need to 
know your personal information ” [SP5]. SP1 did express concern that they were not 
comfortable not knowing who the third parties were. 
The Paradox extension detected that Amazon 
uses usability tracking on its website. 
All the participants agreed that the presence of usability tracking met their 
expectations and many of them suggested that they were happy it was being 
used, e.g. “you can understand that ” [SP16] and “I’m happy it’s there ” [SP10]. 
The Paradox extension detected that analytics 
were being used on Amazon. This included the 
use of mouse tracking, click detection, and scroll 
detection. 
Typically, the participants either expected the presence of analytics or did not 
mind that it was there, e.g. “you would expect that to be there, they want to know 
what you’re browsing and when ” [SP16]. SP11 mentioned that there were more 
tracking types than they had expected but that they were still comfortable with 
their usage. 
The Paradox extension detected 27 different 
types of data which Amazon said it could collect. 
This information varied from basic personal 
information such as an email address, to much 
more intrusive data such as a user’s credit 
history, VAT number, and WiFi password. 
No single participant was happy with the volume or types of data being 
collected at Amazon. 
In the non-technical groups, participants agreed that the data being collected 
was ”too much ” and that it “did not meet expectations ”. Participants were clearly 
shocked with one branding the data types as “intrusive ” and claimed that there 
was “far too much data collection ”, e.g. “half of those I’d like them to take off ” [SP16]. 
In the technical groups, participants were equally concerned. Participants said 
that they were “worried ”, and “scared ”; SP10 said that there was “lots of stuff they 
don’t need ” and that they were “not happy, especially if this is being sold on ” while 
SP9 said, “There’s a lot more than I expected ”. Overall, the participants agreed that 
their expectations had not been met “at all ” and some called for Amazon to 























hey could find any privacy violations. All but one of the par- 
icipants found at least one violation when they were free to 
rowse the web with the Paradox extension. 
All the non-technical participants agreed that they would 
onsider reporting a violation using the Paradox extension’s 
iolation reporter if they found one. However, SP18 said that it 
ould depend on their opinion towards the severity of the vi- 
lation and SP16 questioned whether a report would be taken 
eriously by a company like Amazon or Facebook. 
All the technical participants – bar SP9 – suggested that 
hey would consider reporting a violation if they found one.
P9 – who said that they would not consider reporting a vi- 
lation using the Paradox extension – explained that they ere concerned that reporting a website for a privacy viola- 
ion would expose them to that website, and were concerned 
hat those websites may then treat them differently. 
.3.26. Privacy awareness 
articipants were asked whether they believed that the Para- 
ox extension had made them more aware of their personal 
rivacy. Every participant agreed that they were more aware 
fter using the Paradox extension. 
In the non-technical groups, participants explained that 
hey were more aware, and that their expectations towards 
ebsites had been changed for the worse, e.g. “I think more 
bout the way I behave online now ” [SP17]. When asked whether 
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Table 6 – Evaluation results on Facebook. 
Evaluation Participant Response 
On Facebook participants recorded between 5–50 
trackers. 
All the participants agreed that the total number of trackers they had on 
Facebook was typically large. However, most participants expressed that they 
were not particularly concerned about this and that it met their expectations. In 
one of the technical focus groups there was a slightly more mixed feel, with 
some participants suggesting that they were a “little worried ” at the high number 
of trackers Facebook was storing on their devices; SP13 indicated that they had 
“loads more ” after around 10 s had passed and found this especially concerning. 
Facebook use personalised advertising and show 
sponsored content when you browse their 
website 
All the participants agreed that advertising on Facebook was expected and that 
they were comfortable with it. 
The Paradox extension detected the usage of 
cookies on Facebook for the purpose of uniquely 
identifying users 
All the participants said that Facebooks usage of cookies met their expectations. 
The Paradox extension found that Facebook - 
unlike Amazon - does not suggest that it may 
release personal information. 
All the participants said they were pleased about this, but also admitted that 
this exceeded their expectations, e.g. “that’s quite good actually ” [SP2] and “from 
experience, Facebook don’t even give data to law enforcement either, which is interesting ”
[SP5]. SP11 suggested that they were “surprised ” while SP17 asked “has this 
changed recently? ” and added “that’s precisely how it should be ”. This pattern was 
present across technical and non-technical groups. 
The Paradox extension detected that Facebook 
retains personal information ‘until your account 
is deleted’. 
All the participants were content with this and suggested that their 
expectations had been met, e.g. “I suppose you would expect that ” [SP16]. However, 
SP13 queried “When is no longer necessary? ” and suggested that this could allow 
Facebook to store personal information after an account is deleted. SP11 also 
questioned whether data really is deleted after Facebook claims that it has been. 
The Paradox extension detected that Facebook 
was using TLS security measures as a method of 
protecting personal data. While significantly less 
security features were discussed in Facebooks 
privacy policy in comparison with Amazon, their 
presence was not omitted entirely. 
Almost all the participants expressed concern that there seemed to be a lack of 
transparency about personal data security in Facebook’s privacy policy. 
In one of the non-technical groups, expectations were generally met; this group 
suggested that “lots of the data [on Facebook] is public, so they might not care [about 
security] as much ”. In the other non-technical group, only SP14 said that their 
expectations had been met, adding that “we all know how Facebook are a little bit 
shady with what they do with data, so I’m not surprised [that there is less here], but I’m 
disappointed ”. The other participants agreed that they were not happy and were 
displeased that there was not more information present. 
In the technical groups, participants were concerned with the lack of 
transparency and were worried about certain technologies which were not 
listed, e.g. “worried about [the] security of my data as there is so much [of it] ” [SP7]. SP4 
added that “when we were looking at Amazon wasn’t there a long list of ways data 
was being secured? It would be interesting to see what things are not being used to 
secure our data on Facebook ”. 
The Paradox extension detected that direct data 
collection methods were being used on 
Facebook, including – interestingly – face 
recognition technology. 
All the groups expressed that they were very concerned about the usage of facial 
recognition technology in obtaining personal identifiable information about 
them. 
Across the non-technical groups, most of the participants suggested that they 
did not mind or expected this from Facebook, but they did brand it as “creepy ”
and “scary ” and SP11 asked “why would they want to do that? ”. SP17 mentioned 
that they were “very, very concerned with that ” and spoke about a similar attempt 
to use facial recognition technology in Russia via the public app FindFace in 2016 
which could be used to discover peoples social media profiles by taking a picture 
of them. In response, SP18 suggested “everyone’s phone does it anyway, I kind of 
expect it ”. 
In the technical groups, one group was very concerned about the usage of facial 
recognition and suggested that their expectations had “not at all ” been met, e.g. 
“that’s quite worrying, it doesn’t meet my expectations at all ” [SP8]. In the other 
technical group, there were still some concerns about the usage of facial 
recognition but overall, these participants were not too worried and considered 
that their expectations had been met. 
Facebook was detected using external data 
collection by the Paradox extension. This 
included information that was provided by other 
people, and information provided by partners. 
All the participants agreed that this met their expectations, e.g. “partners like 
Instagram I think they share with which is okay, I expect it ” [SP3]. However, SP6 
replied that “this assumes partners are somehow related to the website, but they might 
actually not be ”. 
The Paradox extension detected that Facebook 
offers its users the capability to make an 
information request from its website. 
All the participants agreed that this had met their expectations; SP16 added that 
they “absolutely ” expected this. 
The Paradox extension detected that Facebook 
was using personal information to ”make 
suggestions ” and “give you tips ”. 
All the participants agreed that this met their expectations. SP19 participant 
suggested that they were “happy ” with this usage of their personal information 
and SP7 said “I don’t mind it, it’s a given ”. 
The Paradox extension determined that 
Facebook provide their users with an option to 
reject data collection. 
Across the groups, participants seemed surprised that they were able to reject 
data collection on Facebook. Multiple participants suggested that they were 
”happy ” while others said that this was ”good ”. 
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Table 6 ( continued ) 
Evaluation Participant Response 
Unlike Amazon, the Paradox extension did not 
detect any consequences for rejecting data 
collection at Facebook. 
None of the participants expected that Facebook would not suggest any 
consequence to rejecting personal data collection; SP3 said that they were 
”somewhat surprised to be honest ”. SP16 said that they were ”pleased ” while others 
expressed that this had ”exceeded expectations ”. 
The Paradox extension detected that Facebook 
uses third party sharing to share information 
about its users. 
In the non-technical groups, only SP11 and SP18 suggested that their 
expectations had been met; ”they’ve got to have some way of paying their employees ”
[SP18]. The other participants were not happy with their information being 
shared and SP17 suggested that it made them feel ”uncomfortable ”. 
In contrast, both technical groups considered this behaviour normal and said 
that it met their expectations, e.g. ”it’s expected ” [SP2]. 
The Paradox extension detected that usability 
tracking was being used on Facebook for the 
purpose of improving their products. 
All the participants agreed that this met their expectations and many 
participants reiterated that they believed usability tracking was a positive thing 
which could improve their user experience, e.g. ”that’s fair enough ” [SP10]. 
The Paradox extension detected many ways in 
which Facebook uses analytics to track how its 
users browse their website. This included some 
less specific information such as: ’how you use 
features’ and ’actions you take’. 
All the participants said that the analytics being collected by Facebook met their 
expectations, e.g. ”that’s okay really, it’s expected ” [SP10]. However, SP11 did state 
that some of them were ”a bit strange ”. 
The Paradox extension detected 35 different 
types of data which Facebook can collect on its 
users. This included some generic data types 
such as an email address, but also included 
some irregular data types such as: call log, 
health information, battery level, Bluetooth 
signals, and places you like to go. 
None of the participants said that the data types being collected met their 
expectations. 
In the non-technical groups, participants were very unhappy with the data that 
was being collected. The participants in these groups made a variety of 
comments about the data types, including: ”that’s crazy ”, ”it’s none of their 
business ”, ”way over the top ”, ”very personal ”, and ”unethical ”. SP13 added ”that’s too 
much, I didn’t expect that ” and SP16 said ”that’s way over the top, it’s far too much 
information that they’re gathering ”. 
The technical groups suggested that they already had low expectations of 
Facebook but SP7 said, ”this is still much worse [than I expected] ”. SP1 called for a 
justification on why all this data was required, saying, ”some of this is expected but 
some of it I would like to see justified ”. SP3 said, ”there are some very odd things here. I 
don’t want a lot of this ” while SP4 added ”I’m curious to know how it gets all of this 
information ”. 
Table 7 – Number of participants whose expectations were met. 
Amazon Facebook 
Non-Tech Tech Non-Tech Tech Total 
Advertising 9 (100%) 10 (100%) 9 (100%) 10 (100%) 38 (100%) 
Cookies 9 (100%) 10 (100%) 9 (100%) 10 (100%) 38 (100%) 
Data Release 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 9 (100%) 10 (100%) 19 (50%) 
Data Retention 3 (33%) 0 (0%) 9 (100%) 10 (100%) 22 (58%) 
Data Security 9 (100%) 10 (100%) 6 (67%) 2 (20%) 27 (71%) 
Direct Data 
Collection 
9 (100%) 10 (100%) 5 (56%) 5 (50%) 29 (76%) 
External Data 
Collection 
1 (11%) 5 (50%) 9 (100%) 9 (90%) 24 (63%) 
Information Request 9 (100%) 10 (100%) 9 (100%) 10 (100%) 38 (100%) 
Recommendations 6 (67%) 10 (100%) 9 (100%) 10 (100%) 35 (92%) 
Reject Data 
Collection 




2 (22%) 6 (60%) 9 (100%) 10 (100%) 27 (71%) 
Third Party Sharing 0 (0%) 6 (60%) 2 (22%) 10 (100%) 18 (47%) 
Usability Tracking 9 (100%) 10 (100%) 9 (100%) 10 (100%) 38 (100%) 
Analytics 9 (100%) 10 (100%) 9 (100%) 10 (100%) 38 (100%) 
Data Types 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Combined Total 84 (62%) 107 (71%) 112 (83%) 126 (84%) 


















































































Table 8 – Interview participant numbers. 
Technical Non-Technical 
SP1, SP5, SP6, SP8, SP9, SP10 SP15, SP16, SP17, SP18, SP19 their online behaviour would be different after using the Para-
dox extension, SP17 said, “very much so - it’s astonishing the
amount of data they collect on you, which is concerning and wor-
rying ”. 
The technical groups admitted that their behaviour would
be changed after using the Paradox extension. Participants
agreed that the Paradox extension was a great way of visu-
ally “seeing things in a more readable way ” and that “some of the
information is really worrying ”. SP4 said, “a lot of the time you see
something pop up and people click ‘yeah - I don’t need to worry about
this’ but some of the information - the types particularly - were really
quite worrying ” and that “once data has been shared with another
third-party it could be used for literally anything ”. SP9 also noted
that while their behaviour would change, “the problem is [that]
you can’t use the Paradox extension until you’ve clicked on the web-
site ”. 
6.3.27. Impact on other websites 
Participants were asked whether they believed that the Para-
dox extension has made changes to their wider behaviour, in-
cluding their expectations towards other websites which they
had not visited with the extension. All the participants agreed
that their opinions and expectations towards other websites
had changed after using the Paradox extension. 
Non-technical participants agreed that they would be more
likely to check other websites with the Paradox extension
before using them and that their wider expectations had
changed. SP14 said, ”websites have far more information than I
actually realise ” and ”I intend to use this on other websites now ”. 
Technical participants were worried about the extent of
third party sharing on other websites and how their data can
be used on other websites. Participants made a variety of com-
ments, including: ”I now wonder about other websites, especially
smaller websites ” and ”any other website could have privacy viola-
tions like this ”. SP4 added that ”there’s no clarity on how data will
be used, so you have to assume that it will be used for anything ”. 
6.3.28. Feedback 
Participants provided a variety of general feedback on the
study, extension, and focus groups. Some of this feedback is
outlined below in: General Feedback and Improvements to the
Paradox extension. 
Participants provided a range of feedback for the Paradox
extension, all of which was positive: ”very clever tool [SP16] ”,
and ”very impressive [SP12] ”. 
SP9 also said that they now ”realised things I didn’t know be-
fore ” as a result of the focus group. 
A number of suggestions were made towards the Paradox
extension which have been described at depth in Section 8.2 . 
From the focus groups specifically, suggestions were made
towards increasing the visibility of violations within the full
report, including tooltips within the full report to explain what
each section means, adding direct links from the full report to
the privacy policy, and porting the Paradox extension for use
in Firefox. 
6.4. Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were carried out to determine
whether the changes in expectations, opinions and privacyawareness observed during the focus groups, could demon-
strate more permanent behavioural changes. Interviews were
carried out exactly a week after the focus groups; partici-
pants were asked not to change their browsing behaviour
and to check the Paradox extension whenever it felt nat-
ural; participants were asked whether they were able to
use the Paradox extension naturally throughout the week in
Section 6.4.2 . 
The interviews were carried out using the same meeting
software as the focus groups as the participants were now al-
ready familiar with the technology. 
Participants were asked 5 separate questions related to
their behaviours, opinions, and expectations while using the
Paradox extension, in summary: 
• Paradox Usage - Participants were asked whether they had
managed to use the Paradox extension regularly through-
out the week. 
• User Expectations - Participants were asked if they found
any more websites which did not meet their expectations
as a result of using the Paradox extension for a week. 
• Privacy Violations - If participants found any privacy viola-
tions, they were asked to explain whether they considered
reporting it using the privacy violation reporter. 
• Privacy Awareness - To determine if the participants still
believed they were more privacy aware after using the
Paradox extension, they were asked about whether their
actions on websites they visited had changed since using
the Paradox extension, and whether they believed their pri-
vacy awareness had changed. 
• Impact on Other Websites - Participants were asked to con-
sider whether they still believed that their opinions or ex-
pectations towards websites they had not visited with the
Paradox extension, had changed since they had started us-
ing the Paradox extension. This was asked to determine
whether the Paradox extension has a wider impact on
the browsing habits of its users, or whether any poten-
tial change of privacy awareness was limited to websites
which participants had seen a Paradox extension report
for. 
6.4.1. Participant information 
Following the focus groups, eleven participants agreed to take
part in an optional follow-up interview; participants will re-
tain the same participant number throughout this evaluation,
which is demonstrated in Table 8 . 
The interviews took around 5 min to complete, with some
taking up to 10 min. Participants were given opportunities to
speak freely about the Paradox extension and their privacy as
well as being asked structured questions. The responses were
analysed and have been presented as findings below. 









































































































.4.2. Paradox usage 
ll but one of the technical participants had managed to use 
he Paradox extension throughout the week, e.g. “every website 
’ve been on, I’ve checked it to see what come up ” [SP5]. SP6 was un-
ble to use the Paradox extension since the focus group, say- 
ng, “I haven’t been able to, but not from lack of wanting to - time
as just not allowed it ”. 
Of the non-technical participants, all managed to use the 
xtension throughout the week since the focus group, e.g. “Yes,
 have. I visited quite a few websites with it ” [SP15]. 
.4.3. User expectations 
side from SP6 – who had not used the Paradox extension 
ince their focus group – the technical users all found that 
heir expectations had not been met on at least one web- 
ite they had visited with the Paradox extension since their 
ocus group, demonstrating a wider issue between user pri- 
acy expectations and privacy actuality. There were multiple 
ases where websites did not provide a method for requesting 
ersonal information, while websites without privacy policies 
ere also found. SP10 also added that “[the types of data be- 
ng collected] did not meet my expectations at all ” for the websites 
hich they had visited with the Paradox extension. 
All the non-technical participants found websites where 
heir expectations had not been met, apart from SP16; how- 
ver, SP16 did add that they were “unhappy with some data 
ypes ”. SP18 found 6 violations on 1 website, including track- 
ng methods which were being used on them, but were not 
eclared within the privacy policy. Three of the participants 
lso found websites which did not have a privacy policy. 
SP17 said that they had used a VPN while browsing the in- 
ernet at one point and found that their location was being ex- 
osed despite this; “even though I had a VPN, it immediately knew 
y location ”. The participant said that they had asked them- 
elves, “How are you bypassing my VPN? ” and that the Paradox 
xtension revealed that “session data on my device was being col- 
ected ”. The participant expressed concern that they now be- 
ieved the website was storing information about their device 
rom previous visits to remember device location, which they 
ad not known about before. 
Collectively, most participants had found at least one web- 
ite where their expectations were not being met since their 
ocus group. This demonstrates that the gap between user pri- 
acy expectations and privacy reality is not limited to a small 
umber of websites. 
.4.4. Privacy violations 
one of the technical participants said they had reported a 
rivacy violation, despite all admitting they had found at least 
ne. The participants all suggested that they had considered 
he idea and would be likely to report a website in the future,
.g. “I have considered it ” [SP5] and “I didn’t want to because they 
ere small sites, I would if it was a major site ” [SP10]. SP8 sug- 
ested that they were “not sure where the report will go or what 
ill happen ”. 
There was a mixed response to violation reporting from the 
on-technical participants. When asked if SP17 would con- 
ider reporting a big company, they said, “No, I wouldn’t. I think 
t would be ignored. If it was a smaller company, yes I would ”. SP16as also reluctant to use the violation reporter, suggesting 
hat “I wouldn’t be confident enough ”. 
SP15 found that their company intranet had no privacy pol- 
cy by using the Paradox extension. As a result, they contacted 
he website administrator directly to ensure that one was put 
n place; “we need to have a privacy policy ”. Further to this, they
sked the website administrator to use the Paradox extension 
hen designing the policy, to ensure that it conformed as it 
ould be expected to. 
.4.5. Privacy awareness 
he technical participants all agreed that they remained more 
rivacy aware since they started using the Paradox extensio,
.g. “more aware of how companies try to find loopholes ” [SP1] and 
I’ve learnt things that I never knew existed before ” [SP8]. In addi- 
ion, SP6 added, “I would be very interested to use it more over time
o see how other sites compare ”. 
The non-technical participants also agreed unanimously 
hat they were more privacy aware, “without a doubt ”, e.g. “I 
idn’t realise how many things they actually knew about me. I’m 
ore cautious about where I look ” [SP16] and “It shows you data 
eing collected which I hadn’t considered ” [SP15]. 
.4.6. Impact on other websites 
very participant, apart from SP8, suggested that their opin- 
ons or expectations towards websites which they had not vis- 
ted with the Paradox extension had been changed by websites 
hich they had visited with the Paradox extension. SP8 said 
hat they were not as concerned as they were directly after 
he focus group, ”but it is quite worrying ”. Other participants 
uggested that they were more concerned, e.g. “if one or two 
ig companies are doing it, then other companies will be doing it as
ell. It might not stop me using them though as a proportion of my
nternet functionality would be lost ” [SP1] and “I did that a lot, I
ent onto one site, then went on to another to see if that website
lso did it. Most of the time, yes, they also do it ” [SP10]. 
All the non-technical participants agreed that their opin- 
ons towards other websites had been changed as a result 
f using the Paradox extension, e.g. “I’m concerned that similar 
ebsites are collecting the same, if not more information ” [SP15] and 
yes it’s raised awareness of this and the importance of how much is
eing collected. I’m more likely to compare websites with the Paradox 
xtension ” [SP19]. 
.4.7. Encouraging discussion on privacy awareness 
P6 found that they were shocked by the amount of data 
hich was being collected and decided to share the results 
hey had found with the Paradox extension; “I discussed it with 
y wife and told her a number of the things that I now know are be-
ng collected and she was shocked at the amount of data and some-
hat bemused at the types of data. My wife’s reaction was like ’Oh
y, you must be kidding!’ ”. This demonstrated that there is an 
nterest in privacy awareness and shows that users can of- 
en be unaware of the privacy implications of using websites.
owever, it also demonstrates that through the Paradox ex- 
ension, a participant was encouraged to speak out about pri- 
acy, and thereby potentially improve the privacy awareness 
f a non-participant. 




















































































Fig. 21 – Third party data collection at facebook. 6.4.8. Acceptance of data collection 
One participant – SP9 – had demonstrated that they were al-
ready very sceptical and concerned about their privacy prior
to using the Paradox extension. They suggested that – through
the Paradox extension – they have come to accept that their
data will be collected and shared, often without them know-
ing about it. As such, they admitted that their behaviour had
changed and they had therefore decided to embrace or ac-
cept privacy issues facing them, rather than hide from them;
“I don’t do cash back offers either as I don’t want every company in
the world having my email address and misusing/leaking it. I know
it means I miss out on discounts, but I see it as the cost of extra se-
curity. But from what you showed me on Facebook gathering stuff
about non-members, then not so sure anymore ”. 
6.4.9. Changing privacy settings 
SP17 indicated that they had taken more of an interest in the
privacy choices they can make after using the Paradox exten-
sion. As such, they made the decision to change the privacy
settings for their Amazon devices; “I changed the privacy settings
on my Amazon devices as a result of using the Paradox extension ”. 
6.4.10. Making purchases elsewhere 
SP19 said that they had made the decision not to make a pur-
chase based on the feedback given to them by the Paradox ex-
tension for that website; “I was going to buy something online but
didn’t because the website wouldn’t let me have a copy of the data it
was collecting according to the Paradox extension ”. The participant
indicated that this was particularly concerning “especially as fi-
nancial information was involved ”. This demonstrates a change
in behaviour, where a participant is showing a high level of pri-
vacy awareness and considering their privacy to be more valu-
able than the potential benefits of making a purchase from the
website. 
6.4.11. Feedback 
Participants were positive about the Paradox extension over-
all. SP16 admitted that the Paradox extension “has opened my
eyes ” and SP17 asked, “Can I keep using it? I want to carry on us-
ing it ”. All the participants praised the Paradox extension, and
many requested that its development continues beyond this
study. 
A number of suggestions were made towards the Paradox
extension which have been described at depth in Section 8.2 . 
From the interviews specifically, suggestions were made to-
wards porting the Paradox extension to Firefox, providing a
clearer message to users when the Paradox extension has de-
tected a privacy violation, and automatically reporting viola-
tions by sending them centrally under the Paradox extension’s
name, rather than through users. 
At the time of writing, the Paradox extension has received
two public reviews on the Chrome Web Store. Both reviews
were positive and left a five-star rating. 
Additional feedback was received (although not requested)
after the Paradox extension was made public on the Chrome
Web store. All the feedback received was positive with one
specific comment saying, “I don’t think I ever want to use Ama-
zon ever again [after] looking at what their T&Cs say about data
collection from your plugin! ”. 7. Discussion 
7.1. Data and anonymity 
Through the use of the Paradox extension, this study has
demonstrated a large number of ways in which data is col-
lected and used - often unbeknown to the user. Participants
didn’t consider either their privacy expectations, or poten-
tial privacy consequences. Much of how data can be collected
and used is governed by the GDPR, which suggests that users
place trust in this regulation without necessarily understand-
ing it’s implications. While anonymity is becoming a more im-
portant factor (with the increasing availability of technologie
such as VPNs), anonynimity doesn’t change how data is col-
lected, stored and used. Whether a website collects personal
data through an anonymity tool or not, that data is often the
same (e.g. telephone number, address) and therefore the ways
it can be stored and used remain the same. 
7.2. Usage observations 
When the Paradox extension was being designed to detect
keywords from within privacy policies, multiple policies were
manually reviewed with the aim of improving accuracy. In
Facebook’s privacy policy, the privacy impact of third-party
tracking is particularly apparent: ’Partners provide informa-
tion about your activities off Facebook - including information
about your device, websites you visit, purchases you make,
the ads you see and how you use their services - whether
or not you have a Facebook account or are logged in to Face-
book’ ( Facebook, 2018 ) ( Fig. 21 ). The quote implies that Face-
book may collect personal information, even if that person
has never visited or heard of Facebook before. While third-
party tracking is a relatively well-known practice, the legal im-
plications of storing personal data on someone without their
knowledge or consent are unclear. 
The Paradox extension detected that Amazon uses GET/-
POST requests, but the number of requests was based on
whether the user was using ad-blocking technology. When an
ad-blocker was not in use, the number of GET/POST requests
detected was between 2–3, but when an ad-blocker was being
used, that number rose to between 30–47 requests ( Fig. 21 ). All
the additional requests were related to advertising and com-
prised of a unique id, followed by a JavaScript function that
contained links to many advertising partners. This approach
is designed to bypass the usage of an ad-blocker, making it ob-
solete. By doing this, Amazon is taking control away from the
user and forcing them - unknowingly - to view personalised
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dverts and tracking regardless of personal preferences. Other 
echnologies also influenced the number of requests made by 
mazon, including cache, which – when cleared – resulted in 
 larger number of requests being made ( Fig. 22 ). 
.3. Participants had no prior privacy expectations 
one of the participants had considered their privacy expec- 
ations in any depth prior to the evaluation conducted with 
hem. Only SP9 expressed concern for their privacy before us- 
ng the Paradox extension, any many participants suggested 
hat they had never thought about what their privacy expec- 
ations were, with some initially suggesting that they “didn’t 
ave any ” [Section 6.3.3] . 
Some participants implied that they just expect websites to 
bide by privacy law and act responsibly, however they also ad- 
itted that they did not know if this really happened in prac- 
ice. Website privacy seems to be something that very few peo- 
le are considering - as demonstrated in Section 6.3.3 . Trust 
nd reputation perhaps have a much more significant effect 
n biases of using specific websites, both of which are easier 
o determine than privacy realities. 
.4. Privacy expectations are different to privacy reality 
vidence from Section 6.3.21 demonstrates that typically,
sers expectations are not met on websites. This pattern was 
lso noticed after participants used the Paradox extension for 
 week, as described in Section 6.4.3 . The most critical expec- 
ation not to be met was for the types of personal information 
ebsites were collecting; no participants were happy with the 
mount of personal information Amazon and Facebook were 
ollecting. 
Many users do not consider their privacy expectations be- 
ore using a website – as explained in Section 7.3 – but when 
hese expectations are considered, they are frequently not 
et. At Facebook, participants found that their expectations 
ere met 84% of the time, while at Amazon this dropped to 
7%. 
90% of interviewed participants - who had used the Para- 
ox extension since the focus group - found at least one other 
ebsite which did not meet their expectations while using the 
xtension for a week. 
Privacy expectations of websites simply do not match up to 
ser expectations. While there were cases where websites did 
eet user’s privacy expectations, the number of times users 
eported that their privacy expectations were not met, demon- 
trates a clear divide between privacy expectations and pri- 
acy reality. This has implications; many users may unknow- ngly be using websites where their privacy is not being han- 
led in a way that meets their expectations. 
.5. Participants did not understand the extent of third 
arty sharing 
hird-party selling and sharing split the opinions of the tech- 
ical and non-technical participants in this study, as indicated 
n Section 6.3.24 . Typically, non-technical users stated that 
hey were unhappy with third parties having access to their 
ata while technical users were far more comfortable with the 
dea. 
It is possible that technical users are more aware of third 
arty selling/sharing and have therefore become more famil- 
ar and accepting of it, thereby expecting it without necessar- 
ly understanding it. By contrast, non-technical users who are 
ess familiar with the practice, made clear that they were far 
ore concerned with it. 
Despite the differences in opinion, all the (technical 
nd non-technical) participants agreed that third party sell- 
ng/sharing should not take place without prior consent. This 
eemed to be a universal opinion, with many participants also 
eferring to various laws where they believed this was re- 
uired. However – as demonstrated in Section 7.2 – Facebook 
dmits to receiving personal information from third parties 
whether or not you have a Facebook account or are logged in 
o Facebook’. This has potential implications as it can make 
t difficult for users to track where their information is being 
ent, what information is being sent, when it is being sent, and 
hether they have any control over it - and in the case of Face-
ook, users won’t necessarily even know that it is happening 
s their personal information may be shared with Facebook,
hether they have an account or not. 
.6. Paradox improved privacy awareness 
articipants overwhelmingly admitted to becoming more pri- 
acy aware after using the Paradox extension. All participants 
rom the focus groups and interviews had become more aware 
f their privacy when using websites. This demonstrates that 
he participants were all willing to develop a better privacy 
indset and suggests that a tool like the Paradox extension 
as the potential to cause a widespread change to privacy 
wareness. 
In addition, the Paradox extension inadvertently encour- 
ged participants to openly discuss their privacy expectations 
nd findings outside of any evaluation. One participant unex- 
ectedly demonstrated this by discussing their privacy expec- 
ations openly, as described in Section 6.4.7 . While the Para- 
ox extension can help individuals to understand the privacy 


























































































implications of specific websites, by inducing privacy discus-
sion among its users, a much wider impact could be made. As
such, the Paradox extension could be used alongside privacy
awareness education/training as a tool for demonstrating pri-
vacy realities, which do not align with business or user expec-
tations. 
7.7. Paradox was effective as an educational tool 
During the summative evaluation, participants demonstrated
improved privacy awareness. Throughout the summative
evaluation, much of the information provided to participants
about their privacy was previously unknown to them. Ad-
ditionally, usage of the Paradox extension enabled partici-
pants to directly apply, and understand, the new concepts
which were introduced to them during the focus group or
interview. 
Thus, as a privacy education/awareness tool, the Paradox
extension - when supported by a focus group and/or it’s ac-
companying slides - demonstrated that it could successfully
be used within privacy awareness/education training. The
evaluation results support this; during the hour-long focus
groups, every participant agreed that their privacy awareness
had been improved. 
The Paradox extension has been made publicly available
via GitHub to enable anyone to use it to evaluate their own or
other websites and for use as an educational tool. Paradox can
also be downloaded via https://privacyparadox.co.uk or on the
Chrome Web Store . 
7.8. Threats to validity 
7.8.1. COVID-19 
Throughout this study, the COVID-19 pandemic caused severe
disruption to people’s lives; social distancing became essen-
tial and government-led isolations forced people to remain
indoors. As a result of this, it is likely that individuals spent
more time on the internet, and therefore it is possible that
they spent more time on Amazon and Facebook. 
This has the implication that people may have had a higher
trust for Amazon and Facebook during this study, because
they were deemed to be more essential. Online shopping
dramatically increased as people deferred from visiting local
stores, which were often largely out of stock. As such, it is
likely that more people used Amazon for essential goods, and
this may have had an impact on peoples trust for the website.
Similarly – with more time spent indoors – people would be
more likely to connect with friends and family through social
media websites such as Facebook, as they were unable to visit
them without breaching Government advice. Facebook would
likely have gained an increased trust as it became a platform
used for connecting people who would otherwise be unable to
communicate. 
This may have had an overall implication on the pri-
vacy expectations of the websites. The participants may have
been more accepting of potential privacy issues because of
how essential these websites had become during this pan-
demic. However, the results still show that users were very
serious about their privacy and many participants were un-happy with aspects of the findings within the privacy policy
summaries. 
Furthermore – due to difficulties brought by the pandemic
– a smaller sample size of participants was used. However, the
demographic variety and expertise of participants was of a
high standard, and the sample size considered appropriate;
Marshall et al. suggest that ‘Single case studies should gener-
ally contain 15 to 30 interviews’ ( Marshall et al., 2013 ). 
7.8.2. Differences in website types 
It is worth considering that Amazon and Facebook offer very
different services. They were picked for this study due to their
prominence as online offerings, but while Amazon is primar-
ily an e-commerce (and cloud) company, Facebook is a social
media website. Participants may have more favourability to-
wards one of these websites, as it is likely that they would al-
ready be familiar with both sites, and therefore already have
formed an opinion towards them. As such, participants may
have expected that website to meet less of their expectations
to begin with, and thus prove a threat to validity. 
The difference in the services each of these websites of-
fer is also a risk, as considered in Section 7.8.1 there may be
some favourability towards one service, due to prior reliance
creating a greater trust. 
7.8.3. Hawthorne effect 
The Hawthorne effect – as described in Section 2.9 – suggests
that participants may perform better under evaluation condi-
tions, as they know that they are being analysed. In the con-
text of this study, it is possible that users behaved differently
and anticipated that they were expected to demonstrate more
privacy awareness as the evaluation progressed. 
One way in which this was managed, was by determining
the privacy expectations of users prior to introducing the Para-
dox extension. As such, it could be determined exactly what
participants were expecting before they were shown the re-
sults from the Paradox extension and therefore, they could not
claim that they had a different expectation than what they
had previously stated. 
7.8.4. Website privacy evolution 
Websites will continue to monitor the laws encapsulating
privacy, but the desire for them to capture personal infor-
mation will remain the same due to its value. Many pri-
vacy tools already exist - and in many cases - websites
have already identified ways around them. For example,
Ad-Blockers can be avoided through detection mechanisms
which then prevent page content from being rendered; Ama-
zon take this approach further, and use alternate means
to fetch ads when an ad-blocker is in use (as explained in
Section 7.2 ). 
This is the same for the Paradox extension; websites could
potentially carefully reword their policies to conform to the
Paradox extension’s analysis and hence bypass keyword anal-
ysis which would otherwise detect potential privacy viola-
tions. However, this can be overcome by continually updating
Paradox. 








































































































his study has demonstrated that - in line with the privacy 
aradox - participants did not fully understand the implica- 
ions on their privacy, nor did they do anything specific to ad- 
ress it. Through using the Paradox extension, the expecta- 
ions of participants were changed, and their privacy aware- 
ess was improved. This suggests that participants were more 
nderstanding of the privacy implications they faced when 
sing websites, and some even demonstrated behavioural 
hanges indicating improvements in privacy attitude over a 
hort period of time. 
In addition, this study has identified that many users do 
ot have any privacy expectations or have never thought 
bout what they might be. Clear differences between the pri- 
acy expectations of users and privacy realities were discov- 
red, and invariably, participants suggested that many of the 
ebsites they use do not meet their privacy expectations. 
.2. Future improvements 
urther research – using the Paradox extension – could be 
onducted to determine the privacy tolerance of individuals 
hen they use websites. Through determining individual pri- 
acy tolerance, it may be possible to understand the personal 
rivacy implications of the privacy paradox. 
Individuals could be asked to use the Paradox exten- 
ion while using websites to determine which privacy-related 
haracteristics of websites cause behavioural changes. This 
ould provide an understanding of which privacy expectations 
ause the greatest change in behaviour when they do not meet 
ser expectations. 
For this study, the measures which individuals take to pro- 
ect their privacy - and the impact these measures have - were 
ot considered. This was to focus on understanding whether 
ebsites meet privacy expectations, rather than understand 
he protections individuals use and their effectiveness. 
Future work could be conducted to determine how privacy 
ools such as VPNs and the Tor protocol affect the privacy ex- 
ectations of individuals, and to to use Paradox to determine 
ow effective these tools are. 
.2.1. Increasing prominence of violations 
uring a focus group, it was suggested that the violations be- 
ng detected by the Paradox extension were the most critical 
iece of information available to the user. Despite this, cur- 
ently, the violations are displayed under ‘Useful Information’ 
hich lies at the bottom of the report. Often, users found that 
 due to the size of the report - the ‘Useful Information’ sec- 
ion was often not visible to the user unless they scrolled to 
he end of the report. 
As part of future work, the ‘Useful Information’ section will 
e moved to a more prominent position towards the top of 
he report. This will allow users to quickly see how many vio- 
ations have been found by the Paradox extension and deter- 
ine what they are with minimal effort. .2.2. Tooltips in full report 
eedback was received which requested that additional infor- 
ation was provided about each heading in the report to pro- 
ide users (whether technical or non-technical) with a better 
ontext for understanding the implications of the findings in 
he full report. 
To implement this, future work will seek to amend each 
ection to include a tooltip. An image (such as a question 
ark) will appear next to each title and - when hovered-over 
 will show a brief description providing a context for the spe- 
ific section. Ideally, this will help engage non-technical users 
ore by helping to understand how to read the report. 
.2.3. Direct links to privacy policy 
P1 suggested that it would be useful to jump to areas in a
rivacy policy related to the findings displayed by Paradox in 
he full report. To rectify this, a button could be added which 
ould take the user directly to the section of the policy which 
he Paradox extension is using for its analysis. 
This can be implemented by storing the location of strings 
n the privacy and adding a button to each item in the policy
nalysis, which will allow users to directly access the relevant 
art of the policy. 
.2.4. Clearer violation warning 
P5 suggested that it was not clear whether there were any 
iolations until they had opened the Paradox extension. They 
dded that for many people, violations could end up be- 
ng missed completely and privacy implications would not 
e made clear. The participant added that some method of 
rominently displaying to the user via a banner, popup, or 
essage directly on the webpage would be incredibly use- 
ul and prevent people from missing privacy violations when 
rowsing websites. 
To implement this, when the Paradox extension detects a 
rivacy violation, a red Paradox logo could be added to the 
TML of the website and made to appear on top of the web-
age. This will enable users to click on the logo to view the
iolation(s) found. Users can then also be given the option not 
o be shown violations warnings on the same website, once 
hey have dismissed the warning. 
.2.5. Automatic violation reporting 
ultiple participants suggested that they were uncomfort- 
ble with reporting violations, either because the process was 
oo complicated, or because they were worried about attach- 
ng their name to such a report. It was therefore suggested 
hat violation reporting should be done automatically, so that 
sers do not have to take steps to report violations themselves.
s such, violations would be centrally reported, and report- 
ng would be done under the name of the Paradox extension,
ather than the name of the user. 
To implement this, a central database will need to be set up 
here privacy violations can be sent by users to the Paradox 
xtension. The Paradox extension would then send out auto- 
atic emails to websites to inform them that a violation was 
etected on their website, and provide constructive informa- 
ion on how to improve it. In addition, the Paradox extension 
ould need to ensure that multiple emails are not sent to the 
ame website when receiving similar privacy violation reports 












































over a short time period. Ultimately, the decision to report a
website would remain with the user, who would be given the
choice to select which violation(s) to report, and add an op-
tional comment. However - unlike the current system - their
personal information would not be attached to the email in
any way, as this would be handled centrally by the Paradox
extension. 
8.3. Using paradox to assess or improve privacy 
awareness 
Formative education already takes place throughout the edu-
cation system to inform students on the impacts of cyberbul-
lying and safe ways to use the internet. The Paradox extension
had an impact on the privacy awareness of every participant
involved in this study, and could therefore be used as an edu-
cation tool for demonstrating the privacy consequences of real
websites, which students are likely to use, such as Facebook.
This could change how students behave online by demon-
strating how their personal information may be used, shared,
or sold. 
Businesses could benefit from using the Paradox extension
by defining what they consider to be unacceptable privacy
consequences. They could then distribute Paradox to their
employees to ensure that the websites being visited adhere to
the privacy expectations laid out by the business. This could
be accompanied by a privacy awareness training/education
programme for the employees using Paradox, which may ben-
efit from the use of materials created in this study]. 
After each focus group conducted during this study, ev-
ery participant claimed that their privacy awareness had been
raised. As such, the material used during the focus groups
could be used - along with the Paradox extension - as privacy
awareness training/education material. 
By getting participants to think about their privacy expec-
tations and compare these with privacy realities, this study
has demonstrated that individuals frequently discover differ-
ences between expectation and reality, and thereby have a
higher privacy awareness as a result. This same concept could
be applied on a wider scale to improve the privacy awareness
of individuals more generally. 
The Paradox extension could be used as a tool when de-
signing a new website or privacy policy to ensure that it is
meeting user expectations. This could be achieved by evaluat-
ing new websites and privacy policies against the Paradox ex-
tension internally, orby running an external evaluation which
could make use of existing material. 
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